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Cloud computing is playing an increasingly important role, not only by
facilitating digital trading platforms but also by transforming conventional
services from client-server models to cloud computing. This domain has
given the global economic and technological benefits, it offers to both the
service providers and service subscribers. Digital marketplaces are no longer
limited only to trade tangible commodities but also facilitates enormous service
virtualization across various industries. Software as a Service (SaaS) being the
largest service segment, dominates the global cloud migration. Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS) and cloud-based application development also known as
Platform as a Service (PaaS) are also next-generation computing platforms
for their ultimate futuristic demand by both, public and private sector. These
service segments are now hosted on cloud platforms to compute, store, and
network, an enormous amount of service requests, which process data incredibly
fast and economically.
Organizations also perform data analytics and other similar computing
amenities to manage their business without maintaining on-premise computing
infrastructures which are hard to maintain. This computing capability has
extensively improved the popularity and increased the demand for cloud
services to an extent, that businesses worldwide are heavily migrating their
computing resources to these platforms. Diverse cloud service providers take
the responsibility of provisioning such cloud-based services for subscribers.
In return, a certain subscription fee is charged to them periodically and
depending upon the service package, availability and security. On the flip side,
such intensive technology shift and outsourcing reliance have also introduced
scenarios that any failure on their part leads to serious consequences to the
viii
business community at large.
In recent years technology industry has observed critical and increased
service outages at various cloud service providers(CSP) such as Amazon AWS,
Microsoft, Google, which ultimately interrupts the entire supply chain and
causes several well-known web services to be taken offline either due to a human
error, failed change control implementation or in more recently due to targeted
cyber-attacks like DDoS. These web-based solutions such as compute, storage,
network or other similar services are provisioned to cloud service subscribers
(CSS) platforms. Regardless of a cloud service deployment, a legal binding
such as a Service Level Agreement (SLA) is signed between the CSP and CSS.
The SLA holds a service scope and guarantees in case of failure. There are
probabilities where these SLA may be violated, revoked, or dishonoured by
either party, mostly the CSP.
An SLA violation along with an unsettled dispute leads to some financial
losses for the service subscribers or perhaps cost them their business reputation.
Eventually, the subscriber may request some form of compensation from the
provider such as a service credit or a refund. In either case, the burden of
proof lies with the subscribers, who have to capture and preserve those data
or forensically sound system or service logs, supporting their claims. Most
of the time, this is manually processed, which is both expensive and time-
consuming. To address this problem, this research first analyses the gaps in
existing arrangements. It then suggests automation of SLA enforcement within
cloud environments and identifies the main properties of a solution to the
problem covering various other avenues associated with the other operating
environments.
This research then subsequently proposes architectures, based on the
concept of fair exchange, and shows that how intelligently the approach enforces
cloud SLA using various techniques. Furthermore, by extending the research
scope covering two key scenarios (a) when participants are loss averse and (b)
when interacting participants can act maliciously. Our proposed architectures
present robust schemes by enforcing the suggested solutions which are effective,
efficient, and most importantly resilient to modern-day security and privacy
challenges.
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The uniqueness of our research is that it does not only ensure the fairness
aspect of digital trading but it also extends and logically implements a dual
security layer throughout the service exchange. Using this approach protects
business participants by securely automating the dispute resolutions in a more
resilient fashion. It also shields their data privacy and security from diverse
cyber challenges and other operational failures. These architectures are capable
of imposing state-of-the-art defences through integrated secure modules along
with full encryption schemes, mitigating security gaps previously not dealt
with, based upon fair exchange protocols. The Protocol also accomplishes
achieving service exchange scenarios either with or without dispute resolution.
Finally, our proposed architectures are automated and interact with hard-
coded procedures and verifications mechanism using a variant of trusted third
parties and trusted authorities, which makes it difficult to cause potential




ACL Access Control List.
ART Average Response Time.
CA Certificate Authority.
CSA Cloud Service Agreement.
CSFL Cloud Service Forensics Logs.
CSP Cloud Service Provider.
CSS Cloud Service Subscriber.
FHE Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
IaaS Infrastructure as a Service.
ITSM IT Service Management.
KPI Key Performance Indicator.
OLA Operational Level Agreement.
PaaS Platform as a Service.
PHE Partially Homomorphic Encryption.
QoCS Quality of Cloud Service.
QoE Quality of Experience.
QoOSE Quality of Overall Service Experience.
QoOUE Quality of Overall User Experience.
QoS Quality of Service.
QoU Quality of Usage.
xi
REST Representational State Transfer.
RoI Return of Investment.
SaaS Software as a Service.
SCM Secure Computing Module.
SLA Service Level Agreement.
SLC Service Level Compliance.
SLM Service Level Management.
SLO Service Level Objectives.
SMP Secure Module Platform.
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol.
SOAR Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response.
TA Trusted Authority.
TMP Trusted Module Platform.
TTP Trusted Third Party.
UDDI Universal Description, Discovery and Integration.
UMIN Unique Message Identification Number.




Distributed computing is known by a metaphor called cloud computing (CC)
through its tremendous impact on our relentlessly evolving and innovative
economic surface. CC consists of multiple distributed computing nodes forming
clusters of various interconnected networks along with other smart and resili-
ent computational resources regardless of their geo-locations which empowers
speedy data processing to facilitate and resolve resource hungry and complex
computing problems. It combines various computing frameworks, architectures
for a joint computing effort, which works like a huge computing resource to
serve multiple clients, requesting diverse compute instructions through various
user interfaces. The fact of their on-demand, timeless, and serviceability with
least resource required to access web-based applications. Using browser-based
technologies makes these computing resources more attractive, productive, and
most importantly economical for its clients. CC is potentially inspired by the
client/ server architecture. The basis of these architectures enables a system
to be methodically distributed across diverse platforms in sundry environ-
ments. Client’s service requests are processed by the server machine (back-end
system with more compute resources available) who dispatches anticipated
responses back to the client machine (front-end system with comparatively less
compute resources available). All these requests are generated through the
client, whereas the server is obliged to process responses if all the commu-
nication terms and interaction conditions are met, within an agreed time frame.
Early days of client/server environments, where computing resources be-
came affordable, businesses started keeping them on-site such as dedicated
computer centers. Gradually enterprises started to invest by extending their
(power-hungry) computing resources to match their business requirements as
well to avail efficient data processing capabilities. The dark side to this was
owning big servers and printers, which was a huge cost towards their mainten-
ance, security. Their non-suitability for the environment was also becoming a
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concentration point to the global business community. On the other side, the
fact of retaining unwanted, swiftly outdated computing resources was also a
big challenge. A sudden shift into the computing industry offered the idea of
outsourcing these computing facilities to match client’s computing demands.
This infrastructure was kept remotely in commercial data centers, owned by
third parties. These computing service providers offered such economical,
on-demand digital resources equipped with cutting edge technologies, that
clients couldn’t resist, therefore, the concept of maintaining their computing
facilities started diminishing within a few years. Cloud computing emerged
and took the consumer market swiftly, to full fill their data processing needs
in a more reliable, efficient, effective, and economical fashion.
The service subscribers are obliged to pledge the least financial and re-
source commitments which enable them to access state-of-the-art cloud-based
resources with convenience. These technologies serve businesses such as com-
pute, storage, network, or alike digital service provisioning which miraculously
meet their business expectations and computing needs.
The concept of on-demandability, economic competitiveness, and cross
products inter-portability has certainly enhanced novel concepts and competit-
ive edges from the service providers to the service subscribers. This has also
renovated and rebranded the entire supply chain, regardless of products or
business domains. Within the cloud computing realm, the transitioning from
on-premise to cloud computing is where enterprises are focusing on the concept
of virtualization which convinces them for acquiring virtual instances of com-
puting resources, automation processes, and interactive services to facilitate
their business goals as well as their clients.
Innovative trends within the electronic commerce market and its constant
transitioning have opened new horizons towards all emerging digital trading.
According to Gartner the forecast of global public cloud revenue is predicted
to be grown 6.3% in 2020 to a total % 257.9 billion, up from 242.7 billion in
2019,[191].
As CC was further emerging into an excellent resource because of continuous
improvements with the help of researchers and industrial practitioners and
also with an association of esteemed vendors, it was attracting more and
more organizations both in the private and public sector to embrace these
platforms. As the evolution of utility computing was being extended from old
concepts such as time-sharing servers into virtualization was coming live into
the commercial computing paradigm. The CC service catalog was initially
introduced to facilitate some limited type of computing aspects, however, as
time passed these trends get changed and multiple service flavors were being
made available. This includes cloud service models (public cloud, private cloud,
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hybrid clouds) and deployments models (Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform
as a service (PaaS), Infrastructure as a service (IaaS)).
Every organization holds the projection of their potential cloud-based usage
so they can concentrate only on their business processes through these cloud
services. Most of the cloud-based resources are calculated on pay-as-you-go
basis. Their flexible and on-demand instance deployment from a cloud ser-
vice provider(CSP) would encourage cloud service subscribers (CSS) to only
emphasize specific services or resources. The prevents them to avoid any
unnecessary financial overheads such as unanticipated billing costs for unused
CPU cycles, storage locations, or allocated memory blocks. Once the required
cloud services are provisioned, clients evaluate the performance of those web
services through their projected key metrics such as response time, uptime,
availability, and other vital Key performance indicators (KPIs) stating the
web application suitability for the purpose it’s being provisioned. The CSP
measures and publishes those strategic stats such as numbers of 9s. Three 9s
means a service guarantee is pledged by the CSP that the service will be up
99.9% or four 9s represents a 99.99% availability [135]. Provisioning highly
available and fail-safe resources incur extra cost to the CSS, if they don’t need
such availability until they intend to run business-critical web services such as
health, aviation, stock markets, or other alike services, they do not sign-up for
such resources.
CSP being an outsourcing entity, offers their infrastructure commercially,
which of course increases their sales. Offering such shared services on multi-
tenancy business models, where data is processed, stored, and transmitted
through CSP’s owned infrastructure to their multiple clients. Either a human
error, system misconfiguration or an attempt launched by some unsolicited
attacker(s) (internal, external) could introduce serious security threats. It
becomes a perilous issue not only for CSP, the owner, and maintainer of that
facility but the CSS whose data, reputation would be at stake if they have to
face a media or a legal trial for getting involved with a data security/privacy
compromise. To avoid such challenges and to get a smooth service delivery,
both the CSP and the CSS get engaged through a signed contract e.g. Service
Level Agreement (SLA). Such initiative enlists key facts about provisioned
cloud service, its scope, costing, etc., however, due to above-mentioned vul-
nerabilities and in the presence of uncertain hostile actors and adversaries,
the CSP may cease the cloud services, cause unsolicited delays, stagger other
unpredicted and intermittent service interrupts. This becomes unacceptable
for the CSS as they might have paid for these services upfront to the CSP.
Exercising their legal or regulatory obligation, a cloud service consumer can
escalate such matters to the legal authorities to prosecute the service provider in
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terms of demanding reasonable compensations, for breaching the contract, and
to cover their(CSS’s) (financial/ reputational)losses. This refers to instances
when CSS has to experience unscheduled service outages, disruptions during
the agreed service term. There could be a situation when the CSP uses the
CSS for some non-payments. Due to all these circumstances, a well-structured
and appropriate infrastructure is needed, which can flawlessly manage unbiased
arbitrations. A fully integrated system, which can instantly resolve disputes
while confronting other associated properties for such negotiations. Where
fundamentals obligation like security is unconditionally ensured and guaranteed
to a good acceptable and confident level.
There is a problem called, fair exchange that stipulates vital support
towards this challenge. It also embraces those critical properties such as non-
repudiation, timeliness, and security. My research would check the suitability of
fair exchange, as a building block for SLA enforcement within cloud computing
environments in the presence of diverse attackers and other adversaries. My
thesis is about the fact, that CSS and CSP contractually confined through
SLAs, so is it possible that fair exchange protocol (FEP) is the perfect solution?
At these preliminary stages, I am trying to plan a framework using FEP for
this purpose.
1.0.1 Motivation
Enterprises are already making huge efforts to expeditiously migrate their
office automation and production processes to cloud computing environments.
These cloud-based services extensively resolve a lot of problems such as having
on-premise infrastructure for their day-to-day data processing requirements.
To facilitate a confident and trustworthy technology shift, both the CSP and
the CSS sing an SLA which binds them for the corresponding obligations and
segregation of contractual services. SLA violations do occur during the service
provisioning because of various issues where either the service provider or in
some cases the service subscriber deviate from their commitments as defined
in the SLA. Holding someone responsible such as in the case of CSS who has
to suffer from unscheduled service outages or perhaps the if QoS doesn’t meet
their business requirement. Similarly, if the CSP gets into a situation where
the CSS doesn’t pay their dues, in either case. there will be a party who will
be victimized by losing them monetarily or even their business reputation.
Moreover, dealing with SLA violations does require manual work such as the
CSS would lodge a report stating what violation has been observed. CSP
investigations cost the CSS and also reduced productivity however, the most
intolerant part is when CSP demands the CSS for some satisfactory proof
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justifying those SLA violations. This could lead to a situation where such
SLA violations could mean some metadata that is classed as forensically sound
digital evidence. This research was motivated to investigate such scenarios
where dispute resolution can be robustly managed and the perpetrator can be
held liable for such intense commercial damages. Fair Exchange protocols have
been discussed and framed to work with diverse platforms. This research goes a
step ahead by evaluating FEP capabilities and suitability for SLA enforcements
smartly. My prime curiosity behind this entire research work was based upon
the following research questions which were outlined and kept me motivated
to seek some valuable results:-
Question-1 Is it possible to use fair exchange as base protocol for cloud SLA
enforcement?
Question-2 What would be the most appropriate protocol to work with when
service exchange participants are loss averse?
Question-3 How a protocol will mitigate various threats if participating en-
tities act maliciously while the service exchange is being performed in cloud
environments?
1.0.2 Thesis Contribution
The problem of fair exchange is to ensure that when two entities wish to
exchange their respective items (e.g. data, service, financial), no one entity
has an unfair advantage over the other. This research work thus makes the
following contributions:
• Introduces and formalizes the problem of SLA enforcement as a fair
exchange problem.
• Proposes a protocol, based on fair exchange, that solves the SLA enforce-
ment problem.
• Investigates scenarios and their implications when participants are (i)loss
averse and (ii) when participants act maliciously.
1.0.3 Thesis Structure
In this chapter, a basic introduction stating an overview of the research was
presented along with the research motivation, thesis contribution. Following is
the brief structure for the rest of this thesis, as a quick reference:
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Chapter 2 Runs an analysis of the volume of enterprises continuously ad-
apting cloud technologies where there is still a lack of regulatory frameworks,
technical solutions to protect contractual obligations. To cope with the huge
migrating community how SLA enforcement is deal with so far. It also aims
to explore the process automation supporting SLA enforcement. Explores
previous studies to review and correlate how researchers and practitioners have
explored various options.
Chapter 3 This chapter studies fair exchange protocols and assesses their
types, properties, and other associated fringe attributes in terms of their deploy-
ments and application. It also observes protocol’s potential implementation,
operating, technical and security requirements with convergence to SLA en-
forcement in service-oriented architectures.
Chapter 4 Presents two scenarios (i) a system model where two entities can
perform their service exchange under some set business terms and operating
conditions using diverse tools, techniques, and procedures (ii) secondly, it
discusses fault models when the same participants would experience certain
(internal/external)adversaries and analyses their (machine, human) behaviors
to highlight potential threats.
Chapter 5 Justifies a narrative, which was worked out and published based
on Fair Exchange Protocol. It explains the proposed protocol and how it works
when two participants are interacting, while their intent is as loss averse. The
protocol also includes a trusted third party (TTP) which governs the entire
exchange and ensures to uphold the fairness element till the exchange concludes
successfully.
Chapter 6 This chapter discovers and analyses, an extended operating di-
versity when either of the participant or perhaps both, decide to act maliciously
instead of being loss averse, to seek unfair gains over the other, how this
protocol variance shields such scenarios. The protocol also demonstrate its
defenses to other delicate treats such as security and privacy so it ensures its
trustworthiness and transparencies capabilities when enforcing cloud SLAs.
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Chapter 7 Arguments about the protocol implementations, how various
properties such as correctness, non-repudiations, work and maintained. In this
chapter, the discussion about components implementation when the protocols
are being set up in real-world environments has also been studied. Critical
challenges, complexities especially those implications concerned to comply with
regulatory and legal frameworks is also briefly touched.
Chapter 8 Summarizes the thesis by giving a quick recap of the work that
has been done so far on this research voyage. It also extends and marks future
tasks such as developing a framework in the real environments within the
cloud computing paradigm. The work would also explore how these imminent
technologies would respond when diverse cloud environments will be integrated




Modern-day innovative marketplaces have successfully replaced legacy shopping
floors with virtual markets. This transition has also changed other day to
day tasks, service management, and office automation in a way that service
or trading hosts prefer to lease computing resources such as compute, storage,
or network which can serve both commodity traders so they can publish their
products online using digital marketing catalogues, similarly, the buyers can
browse through their digital items using browser technologies to perform online
shopping or to perform some computing tasks such as booking appointments,
paying their bills, desktop publishing, emails, etc. This mutual understand-
ing brings both the Cloud Service Providers(CSP) who offer their computing
infrastructure where the Cloud Service Subscriber(CSS) can either host or
use outsourced web applications and other portal facilities to accomplish their
business requirements. With the huge involvement of utility computing within
e-commerce, ensuring fairness especially when both the CSS and CSP are
anonymous, the end-user or service recipient’s expectations are high that they
will receive their items for the money they have spent. Honesty becomes
inevitable for both the online buyer(service recipient) and the seller(service
executor or the service host) to coordinate well to safeguard service or product
delivery through contracts.
Generally, a CSP does hold a higher responsibility to ensure the reliability
and quality of their cloud-based service provisioning, as these services are hosted
and run on the consistent infrastructure they own. These generic services are
provisioned, depending upon diverse cloud deployment and service models,
which are offered to either a single business entity or multiple individual cloud
tenants through the hosting facility on varying distributed service platforms.
Due to various technical, business, logical reasons, service delivery can get either
interrupted, fail, or stopped (intentionally or unintentionally). The outcome of
these outages affects service recipients who wouldn’t get their item delivered
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as per the subscriber’s expectations promptly. In a worst-case scenario, CSP’s
customers might experience a total service collapse, for innumerable reasons. A
CSS is an entity, who pays for some cloud-based service acquisition, in terms to
have access to a cloud resource so to achieve their business goals by performing
some tasks, processes, automation for a certain amount of time or a service
term. This is CSS’s ultimate obligation to ensure their Return of Investment
(RoI) because they are spending heavy investments while acquiring these cloud
services from an intended CSP who specializes in delivering some specific web
resources.
The way to ensure the service quality and the RoI is fully achieved as
expected, a contractual legal document stating the business requirements,
service scope, and each participant’s obligations are defined. Service Level
Agreement (SLA) is a logical way to bind both the service provider and the
service subscriber, in case of any dispute or misbehave is observed and in
those circumstances, either of the participants can be held accountable and
the victimized can be compensated accordingly. Within the CC service deliv-
ery environments, business entities sign SLAs before service commencement
however, there are a lot of technical and logical lacunas where either party
can try to cheat the other participants. The thesis discusses various problems
and challenges that make the service delivery very harsh and demonstrates
how CSP dominates the service delivery life cycle. Various protection schemes
have been introduced so far however, the critical part of the service delivery
which ensures a true sense of fairness is pretty vague. Previous work by other
researchers mainly spins around the detection of SLA violations and doesn’t
impose such restrictions where either participant can not misbehave and cheat
the others.
This research work connects those dots precisely by highlighting specific
gaps, challenges, limitations concerning data privacy, security that compromises
service delivery and undetected SLA violation. It discusses further associated
protection elements comparing threat actors from end-to-end service delivery
perspective.
In the following sections, we will analyze those elements which form and
play vital roles during a web service delivery. Principally, the web service
paradigm works the same whether the intended clients belong to end consumers
online shopping community or the belong to the corporate end-users who are




Marvels of the world wide web have introduced some fantastic innovations
towards facilitating both the selling and buying entities. Using various internet
or intranet-based protocols web-based services have been digitized and de-
livered remotely to the end-users through these avenues. A web service works
as the prime medium which connects the service consumers(buyers) to the
service providers or the sellers, regardless of their geographic location, opposite
to the monolithic computing. Web services are mainly based on the most
advanced form of client-server computing model where web applications are
hosted to serve various online functionaries for their intended remote clients.
Web service refers to online hosted services using Extensible Markup Language
(XML), Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Representational State Trans-
fer (REST) with the conjunction of various open standards and protocols,
assist users to communicate and interact via diverse communication channels.
[35, 40, 143] Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is mainly used as a
programming language that describes user interfaces, network services whereas
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) is also a web service







Figure 2.1: Web Service Basic Architecture
These functionalities are designed based on some pre-defined business
logic empowered with innovative technologies such as database servers, file
servers, web servers, etc. which process client requests in a fully collaborative
and methodical fashion. A web service could perform various tasks such
as processing an email, office automation, online information processing, etc.
depending upon business requirements. A web-based service is a combination of
digital resources packaged and defined logically along with their corresponding
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resource identifiers made accessible through communicating protocols. An
online service provider may host a site directly or on behalf of one of their
client, which is packaged with various instructions pointing to some addresses
and resources for further processing. Using communication protocols, web
agents (browsing technologies), intended addresses, referenced web resources
are some of the common components. The user interacts by sending some
requests through the service provider’s UI, their requests are processed by the
hosting server.
After time stamping these requests, their appropriate responses for instance
(HTTP response codes) service responses for being successful, redirected, failed
(either client/server-side) are generated. These tasks are also logged into a
repository and are eventually sent back to the initiating remote user by the
hosting server if all the conditions are met. Figure 2.1 narrates a basic web
service architecture which could include four entities such as service provider,
subscriber, brokerage service, and some independent entity who could serve












Figure 2.2: Web Service Life Cycle
A web service life cycle initiates from its creation which holds service
interfaces and operation descriptions followed by other key information like
the implementation plane. Service provisioning is a phase where resource
allocation is defined and configured matching the client’s business requirements
for this service accessibility. Service Composition logically correlates to other
corresponding web services or dependencies to fulfill a task in terms of its
completeness. Service usage is the focal point where user requests are received,
processed, and monitored. Finally, the service management is the phase that
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is responsible for recording the metadata of individual service segments for
future analysis which is fed through to the performance monitoring modules
to detect and correlate any significant service anomalies caused by the SLA
violation [177, 185].
2.0.2 Cloud Service Security & SLA Management
As more and more businesses are embracing cloud-based services, to increase
their overall production. Where it increases their gross revenue by minimizing
computing overheads, the magnitude of associated risks is also growing if the
quality of those provisioned services does not meet the client’s expectations
and risk factors are not mitigated. SLA being the prime instrument binds the
service providers and subscribers by defining QoS and assurance in case SLA
projection fails. Cloud service providers, service brokers, and subscribers agree
on SLA management procedures. SLA being a service controller ensuring service
maintainability within a service-oriented production environment. The entire
service provisioning is lead by CSP’s defined processes, which becomes clumsy
for their clients and restricts their low-level service visibility. SLA violation
conditions are not fully described and intentionally written in a technically
vague fashion to avoid any serious detections and potential penalties. For
instance a SaaS service provisioning, the CSS won’t get any low-level service
metrics, seriously impacting the QoS. CSS is less privileged by not having
fundamental visibility of SLA violation, intermittent outages, and informational
or low urgency security incidents either. CSS might get some modified version
of SLA monitoring stats, which they cannot verify or validated. This becomes
a major concern to the CSS to survive with such service provisioning as their
total online business reliance is on CSP’s produced services. On the other
hand, a CSP can also face a similar situation where a malicious subscriber can
violate the SLA in certain ways.
Service Metrics and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
A metric is a quantitative measurement that refers to some events indicating
system availability or correlating service uptime such as when the intended
service was available with an acceptable usage along with its defined func-
tionalities. Metric is also refereed as a ratio of time when service component
is available and functional to complete some tasks and later expressed as in
percentage (eg.90%) [87]. Using these numbers a cloud service can be analyzed
in terms of its Quality of Cloud Service (QoCS), Quality of User Experience
(QoOUE) and Quality of Overall Service Experience (QoOSE) either at the end
of each service term or middle of a service provisioning to calculate an average
and predict the future service streaming [131, 152]. The very same metadata
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also provides a service failure trail, which supplements Cloud Service Forensics
Logs (CSFL) supporting an investigation by either the TTP, legal authority, or
even a law enforcement agency. Such logs can prove service outages, process/
feature anomalies to justify whether the claimed service credits against SLA
violation are legit and well justified.
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A service Key Performance Indicators(KPIs) are mainly measured against
some predefined targets. Both the service KPIs and service metrics are part
of a cloud service performance management and are the prime resources to
keep track and compare the service from those expectations defined within
the SLA against the actual service delivery to the client site within a service
term. Most of the time a service metric cannot be categorized as a KPI due
to its varying attributes. A service monitoring cannot be measured and prove
its suitability without gathering precise metrics from cloud service processing
nodes to user-facing UIs, as these units are fed into periodic service reports or















Figure 2.3: An ideal Service Monitoring state
Service metrics could be used for various purposes however, these statistics
are mainly used for service agreements and for service management purposes
to determine certain attributes such as service availability, reliability, response
time, security, throughput, capacity, scalability, latency, supportability, eco-
nomic factors. These elements assist a cloud SLA monitoring which relies on
their composition, categorization, and monitoring priorities. Fig 2.3 indicates
service provisioning to the CSS by the CSP, whose service requirements are
measured and matched followed by periodic reports whether the SLA is met
or not so the subscriber can decide if a service will be renewed or will be ter-
minated because service requirements didn’t match with the service capability
or some of the above metric elements [61].
Cloud SLAs & Service Implications
Cloud computing (CC) is vital as the prime service originator & delivery me-
dium. CC is made of delicate network nodes comprising highly scalable, elastic,
on-demand, based inter-connected utility computing resources. These digital
apparatus are fully capable to transform business requirements to compute,
network, storage, and other bespoke services commercially such as Software as
a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) & Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS). [30, 138], are some base-line service models.
Once these cloud services are provisioned against some monetary pledges, the
SLA compliance service delivery becomes the top priority for both CSP and
CSS. SLA prime components are some measurable service values/metrics, ser-
vice functionality when SLA could be associated with a specific service model.
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SLA being the prime instrument enables both the prime parties (CSS & CSP)
to expect their own business gains. Because SLA holds service guarantees,
service metrics, service level objectives (SLOs) and other business, legal and
technical obligations, which binds both service exchange participants into
a contract. Service quality, integrity, and end-to-end performance can only
be measured and monitored using some sophisticated techniques which can
constitute admirable trust and a sense of fairness between these two ends. The
scope of a cloud service agreement (CSA) [58] is also designed to benchmark
all the service fragments e.g. financial, legal, operational, technical implications.
CSP focuses and expects that their digital services and automation products
are provisioned across the globe so they can increase their earnings which
ultimately enhance their business growth and market reputation. Ideally, the
fair service accountability and consistent resource provisioning where the quality
of service (QoS) is thoroughly monitored, should be the principal obligation of
the CSP, as being an ultimate custodian, service originator, and maintainer of
the underlying cloud infrastructure.
On the other hand, the CSS makes a huge financial commitment for
these cloud-based services to automate business processes, production or to
serve other business elements. They can perhaps also intend to resell CSP’s
services, acting as a cloud brokerage or a middle entity by leasing cloud
services on behalf of their clients. CSS, as being the service recipient also
holds a shared responsibility to measure and justify the QoS, reflecting the
business-centric SLOs and performance metrics indicating the service trends,
their associated penalty clauses based upon SLA, until the end of the service
contract [60, 146, 153, 167].
CSP is obliged to ensure service availability, consistency, and quality until
the end of the agreed term. It’s also responsible for ensuring unscheduled
service outages, intermittent service interruptions, privacy, security, and other
similar obligations. Service guarantee indicates within a specific period how
successfully the CSP can meet the SLA conditions and delivers their cloud
services. For instance, a cloud subscriber intending to host a critical service
such as health, financial, or another similar service, can demand at least three
nines e.g. 99.9% whereas another mission-critical service subscriber could even
seek a higher number of those nines e.g. (four nines) 99.99% or even (five nines)
99.999% aiming fully resilient and granular services [66, 135, 189, 212]. CSS,
naturally, holds higher expectations in terms of service quality, performance,
disaster recovery, and some other log management and security elements that
could facilitate forensic investigations for their cloud platform or their extended
client’s environments [29, 153, 208].
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There are so many variances and log granularities when it comes to meas-
uring cloud services through SLAs. A service’s scope, technical implication,
legality binding, security, and other avenues addressing service collaboration in
case of multi-tenancy could encompass various dimensions of an SLA such as
facilities, platform, operating system, application, infrastructure on a higher
level of visibility ensuring service performance and service quality and frequency
of SLA violations [66]. Unfortunately, this course of action is not fully adopted
hence leaving the CSS are made victimized by most of the CSPs. Another
approach highlights the fact that mostly, the proof of burden showing SLA
violations is expected from CSS, who even don’t have access to the required
infrastructure or operating environments where the said logs are stored [30].
SLA violation
If CSS acquires a business-critical cloud service and hosts through a leading
cloud service provider (CSP) using Software as a Service (SaaS) platform. CSS
would evaluate if their business requirements are meeting through this service
against their RoI eg the pay-as-you-go service fees, service subscription to the
CSP for some agreed amount of time. CSS’s next service renewal is conditional
if there is no service level agreement (SLA) violation occurs, otherwise, a service
credit will be awarded to the CSS, upon filing their dispute for a refund. The
non-compliance SLA is classed as an SLA violation by either party, however, it
mainly occurs by the CSP. In another scenario, let assume, after few months of
the service renewal, the CSS again observes that the QoS has been significantly
reduced and SLA gets breached x-number of times. Upon escalation of the
QoS, the CSS decides to file another claim to get service credits from CSP as
compensation, the CSS is challenged to bring some evidence to prove their claim
that CSP was responsible for SLA violation. Now when the CSS does not own
the hosting infrastructure and does not have sufficient privileges to the hosting
facilities so they can place appropriate monitoring arrangements in place as
they were reliant on CSPs stats or SLA periodic summaries, therefore, the
CSS technically would not be able to produce such data or service stats, which
could add significant weight to their claims, logically, the CSP would decide to
decline the claim. Due to several unsettled and disputed SLA violations, CSS
potentially would lose not only their business obligations, financial losses but
their reputation is also put at stack.
This makes serious business turbulence when one business entity can cheat
the other and deprive them of their anticipated technical service ownerships
and financial rights. SLA violation certainly costs a fortune globally when
the majority of the service recipients do not know how to regain their rights
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and held the cheating participants accountable for their actions. This could
have been avoided if an intelligent yet automated solution were deployed to
govern such service exchanges ensuring the sense of fairness at both sides
[118, 142, 146]. CSP could have various motivations to violate the SLA. This
could either be an intentional or unintentional reason which deprives the CSS
have their due service delivery as what they have been agreed in the SLA.
CSS can end up either on having less allocated technical resources such as
CPU cycles, memory, storage, incensing obligation (scope, features), number
of users, number of usages, number of virtual machines, average response time,
latency, etc showing insufficient processing capability then anticipated, which
compromises a service and flags a SLA violation occurrence. An extreme
situation can also arise when a maliciously acting CSP can even terminate
CSS provisioned services due to some unsolicited reason before the end of the
actual service term.
SLA Verification
Cloud computing-based services and solutions certainly empower and automate
phenomenal business productions by provisioning of either individual services
or a group combination of interconnected services. Once these services are
provisioned, keeping an eye on these services against the SLA becomes excep-
tionally tough as the service recipient’s visibility to the factual service metrics
is very limited. They are dependent on CSP statistics or SLA-related metrics
to evaluate whether the services are meeting the SLA or not. In such cases,
some sort of SLA verification can assist service subscribers, such that they can
compare the SLOs against the real service delivery using each service element
along with verification of their associated properties whether functional or
non-functional [77].
SLA verification becomes more challenging when CSS and CSP are exchan-
ging their messages over an untrusted or semi-trusted communication channel.
A CSP could use these untrusted communication mediums as a justification
when they intend to misbehave for instance by reducing resource allocation
allowance to benefit another valued customer [211]. Verifying these services
becomes an ultimate business requirement for the service subscribers so they
can have a good understanding of how they have been treated by their service
providers. There are a lot of schemes that have been introduced to implement
such SLA service verifications[77, 106, 207, 211] on run-time, however, again a
service provider with bad intention could also tackle such verification using
certain techniques.
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SLA Monitoring, Detection & Prevention
Service monitoring in a way that any anomalous stats, could raise a flag has
become a mandatory requirement, however, such a privilege is not extended to
the CSS cloud service platforms by the CSP. Monitoring schemes are mainly
implemented on CSP’s service delivery platforms, which mainly serves them
rather than the CSS. Service monitoring means such technical implementation
using bespoke software to analyze service availability, performance, or any other
service dimension which comes under service disruption or even delivering a poor
QoS to the cloud customers. Certain data and service points are marked using
a diverse set of tools, techniques, and procedures. The entire implementation
covers the entire service level management (SLM) feed by various factors. This
may include feeds from service level compliance (SLC), service-level monitoring,
service level administration, which can be forwarded into a reporting node to
generate periodic reports or SLA summaries for individual clients or a pool of
clients in a multi-tenancy environment.
Detection of SLA violations using a proactive approach can be beneficial for
both the service subscriber and the service provider, in case either of them tries
to cheat their fellow business participant(s). Unsettled SLA violations cost a
fortune to both, the CSP, when they have to repay financial compensations
e.g. service credits against SLA violations, and the CSS when guarantees of
their provisioned cloud services are compromised or failed by the CSP. Worst
case scenario, service providers do disregard a CSS’s legit claims. For instance,
study [11, 180] shows how Amazon’s S3 will class a service failure when the
service availability gets below then 99.9%. Similarly, Microsoft Azure [132],
Google [83], Rackspace [162] and Oracle —- have also mentioned their criteria
for classifying a service outage and calculating service failure liabilities in terms
of SLA violation.
Furthermore, unforeseen factors e.g. insider and outsider cyber threats could
also pose serious threats to the CSS’s production environment. CSP could alone
act maliciously by extending resource allocation from a designated client to
another resource-hungry service subscriber by stealing them quietly. They can
also lower the QoS by service reduction, modification and even dropping them
to significantly low to make other customers happy [211]. Regardless of such act
would certainly lead to a zealous service outage [55, 89, 171, 195]. With regards
to monitoring arrangements [118], logically it becomes the liability to both the
parties to ensure appropriate monitoring mechanism in place however most of
the CSS don’t have such privileges, and hence they entirely reliant on CSP’s
scripts, logs, and reports. Many supporting schemes have been studied so far to
facilitate such monitoring requirements can be implemented [42, 70, 137, 181,
18
216] however, these schemes do introduce some challenges addressing to their
implementation, technical and legal aspects. These challenges do introduce
various compromises throughout the entire service execution from evaluation,
operational, security covering (CIA) Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability,
privacy perspectives.
Complexities while considering the most appropriate solution which works
well not only for SLA monitoring, detection and management but also integrates
well with the novel cloud and IoT technologies. Earlier work shows where
gathering SLA metrics for this purpose with some precise and unambiguous
service specifications and the fact that these measurements carried out by the
CSS are not easy, acknowledgeable, and necessarily facilitated by their service
providers, the work mainly ends up on monitoring and reporting for SLA
violations [179]. Similarly,[139] proposes an architecture that again monitors
the SLA violation by marking various elements such as service points of
presence and by involving third parties as unilaterally and bilaterally, however,
enforcement is yet a challenge, in case of a violation is detected. Other previous
works such as [47, 109, 114, 165, 176] are mainly aimed towards monitoring SLA
violation, their dependencies, and workflow. The enforcement elements were
mainly discussed by [71, 136, 151] has suggested some interesting work, where
SLA monitoring and enforcement is proposed. For instance, the work done by
[151] gives an impression of the complexity and limitations to implementing
the enforcement on both the CSP and the CSS sides. Another piece of research
was nicely performed by [202] who highlights the lack of decision making by
monitoring management platforms and other similar regimes, therefore, their
work spins around detection and prediction states are fed to machine learning
modules which only raise alarms highlighting the SLA violations. The research
work does urge for some integrated solutions which are more effective towards
SLA enforcement in the modern fast pace cloud service realm.
Digital Contract Signing & Cloud Service Delivery
A contract refers to a deal where two or more business participants intend to
get involved in exchanging some product or service reciprocally. They agree
on declaring either one of them would become a service supplier(seller), other
would be classified as service recipient(buyer) who will be at the purchasing
end against some financial commitment or even for service against a service or
item against an item of mutual interest. Once they pass their initial economic
negotiations, terms of services, and terms of reference are agreed upon, the
service provider gets the obligation to deliver the service or service specification
been agreed at the time of their negotiations. Similarly, the service subscriber
also agrees in the contract that a sum of the agreed amount or something
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equivalent will be paid (mostly) or delivered (instead of the agreed payment
if say so in the contract) to the service provider so they can reach to the
end of the contract without having any potential disputes or arguments. Any
unsettled dispute might then get escalated to one of the agreed platforms such
as arbitrator, negotiator, mediator, law enforcement, or even a court of law.
This entire trading holds one prime aspect and that is fairness. The signed
contract between all the parties involved does describe everything about their
obligations, renegotiations, dispute resolutions and other do’s and don’ts to
avoid any disagreements while the trading is being performed or even post
exchanging their goods.
Contract signing protocols are then defined as when multiple parties are
involved in an exchange, they mutually follow a protocol or a set of protocols,
to put a methodical function in place which could maintain maximum fairness.
As per [7, 99, 112, 127] this arrangement facilitate a secure signature exchange
in such a way that none of the participants could alone obtain other’s digital
contents unless the remaining parties have also received them without failing
factors (FF) such as delay, modification, completeness or incorrectness.
For instance, A, B, and C are three participants for signing a contract,
now none of them would be capable to receive the said contract before the
other two parties do so with the notion of the above properties. The fact when
either of the business participants misbehaves and does not honor business
promises, the other party certainly losses their fairness which qualifies this
action as a breach or violation of a contract. Using these notions, we refer to
the contract signing in terms of those scenarios when a service provider who
deals with some digital services advertises them on the internet, which attracts
those customers who are quite keen on purchasing those items. The online
service provider sets out some terms and conditions for this online sale process
which offers some protection to him and in some terms protects the buyer at
the same time. In case of a disagreement those terms and conditions or service
agreements are reviewed and judged so if the buyer has breached those service
terms, the seller will not be honoring any refunds and vice versa. However, if
the service terms do protect the buyer and their trading does show that the
service provider did not behave as anticipated, then it’s obvious that the seller
must pay the buyer their due compensation either a full refund or a service
credit which can later be redeemed.
SLA Enforcement using other techniques
Enormous work has been performed in terms of managing cloud SLAs for their
monitoring, guarantees, violation detection, enabling their security features
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using various techniques and procedures. This research aimed to discover
those avenues which have not yet been used in terms of SLA enforcement.
For instance, [91] puts various filters for stripe-based and distributed-based
monitoring schemes for SLA violation detection, where misbehaving flow is
systematically evaluated. [111] suggested reactive and passive monitoring for
this purpose stating various pros and cons for online and offline monitoring
which is based on contract signing protocol to tackle various challenges. [16, 17]
urges the SLA renegotiation in case of duplicated SLA violation, which in their
vision not only settles the SLA implications but it also prevents over-provisioned
resource management for an optimum deployment.
With regards to SLA enforcement, [151] understands the need for SLA
automation, therefore, suggests a solution to this problem using logical form-
alization e.g. Horn Login and Event Calculus, Deontic Logic, etc. targeting
complex contract rules for incorporating various conditions such as user and
contractual obligation to manage and enforce individual processes. [149] ex-
tends it by reviewing SLA within an SOA architecture as containers of the
functional and non-functional properties through integrating a flexible SLA en-
forcement layer with CSP service infrastructure. This approach rather presents
an extent of complexity and introduces further challenges when enforcing a
mutually agreed framework. Another perspective was discovered by [4] in
which ease has been sought with contractual cloud brokers instead of directly
dealing with cloud service providers. An interesting dimension to resolving
the SLA enforcement was nicely presented by [163] who strongly believes that
automated SLA enforcement can easily be dealt with by integrating a feedback
control system by filtering any inputs associated service delivery faults such
as noise or disturbance, to get the clean measured output, which can work
regardless of the cloud environment.
Introducing three components for this purpose such as a rSLA language:,
rSLA Service and set of Xlets(a generic REST API for monitoring purposes)
which shows a certain level of confidence to achieve the problem for enforcing
the SLA [136]. These solutions do focus on the SLA enforcement alone however,
their solutions merely touch the security and privacy aspects. The idea rolled
over by [202] primarily stresses to Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) which
gets trained and fed the outcomes to another module Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) neural network which performs unique analysis on the services with
poor QoS to enforce the cloud SLAs. Finally, [217] and other similar ideas
suggest solving the SLA enforcement problem with blockchain techniques
gaining credible witnesses which are embedded with smart contracts. This
approach does appeal however, it also presents some of the challenges, while
working and reviewing use cases in the real world.
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Fair Exchange Protocol for Cloud Services
Previously studied literature shows many approaches have been introduced
towards SLA enforcements within cloud computing, however, considering the
SLA enforcement in particular, as a fair exchange problem has rarely been
seen [160]. The Fair exchange protocol (FEP) was previously discussed by
few researchers in different perspective [24, 33, 161, 196, 197], however in
our research context, e.g. FEP’s implications with the notion of contract
signing in distributed systems, it was well explored and nicely debated by
[20, 32, 79, 84, 218]. FEP being a Marvel of e-commerce, enables global
business partners to freely trade with each other demonstrating a great sense
of trust and confidence. Various operating protocols are opted to manage and
supervise electronic trading for distinctive purposes [124, 150, 157].
The entire exchange exclusively spins around ensuring and maintaining a
process composing a notion of effectiveness, timeliness, and fairness [10]. Re-
gardless of exchange commodities (e.g. tangible or non-tangible items) fairness
is the key element to observe so no one can be treated dishonestly against
their contractual commitment and obligations. This refers to sensibly placing a
regulatory and monitoring secure mechanism when two or more corresponding
business entities cannot purposefully or accidentally cause any kind of decept-
iveness by depriving another party of their agreed share or privileges.
Fair exchange protocols are the best fit for the purpose to supervise invis-
ible digital exchanges. Their adaptability to robustly administer electronic
exchanges like emails, electronic payments [79] has undoubtedly proven their
successful significance. The eventual involvement of a Trusted Third Party
(TTP) becomes inevitable, who can play a decisive role to reconcile any dis-
putes or disagreements by supporting their evidence produced by FEP, in the
favor of an affected party in the modern distributed and service-oriented cloud
computing platform. In the upcoming sections, it will be demonstrated how
this research transforms the same idea to gauge cloud-based service delivery
and its dispute resolution, placing an online trusted third party (TTP) to
resolve any issues by keeping their profile as minimal possible using multiple
communication models (asynchronous or synchronous). Previous work where
fair exchange protocols were used for only limited avenues such as certified
emails, digital signatures, and electronic payments [10, 20].
Previous approaches addressing the problem of SLA management, cover
certain service segments by leaving SLA enforcement problems set aside. Their
prime focus sticks towards SLA monitoring, detection, which only raises alarms
to the stakeholders. The gap is clear when both the service subscriber and ser-
vice provider would appreciate having full visibility within a service-orientated
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architecture. It let them govern the process execution, monitors detection,
and collection of key factors such as why, when, and how a service is failed.
It further reviews SLA compliance during the service exchange term. It can
also detect any level of service distribution such controls can investigate sub-
protocols e.g. initiation, setup, exchange, termination, and of course the most
significant of all is dispute resolutions to intact and guarantee fairness. There
are solutions e.g. deploying a diverse implementation of trusted third parties,
auditing deployed web services, inspecting, verification and validation of fair
exchange properties are there, however, with the cloud service industry, finding
such robust solutions which come as a complete package which ensures both the
fairness attributes of service and the security elements, is yet to be introduced.
This chapter highlights various segments of service provisioning within the
cloud service spectrum and how the SLA comes into the QoS monitoring frame.
The chapter also reviews, how cloud service providers devise SLA monitoring,
detection, and anomaly response using their in-house built platforms. Such
arrangements do produce SLA violation data thrown to the service subscribers
for their information. The SLA violations, if caused by the CSP, then a limited
option is made available to compensate the poor QoS, in terms of service
credits, most of the time. To earn these service credits, yet a manual process
is the only option for CSS, which is not fair to them. They cannot ask for a
privilege to have low-level KPIs, so they can justify their RoI at the end of
each service term. CSPs most of the time dominate the entire service plan
by offering the least privileges to their clients especially how the SLA service
terms are measured, monitored, calculated, and eventually billed to the service
subscribers. There are chances that the CSP can trick their customers by
sharing some arbitrary KPIs using various techniques as they do own these
hosting facilities.
The above reviews how these cloud services are monitored and how sub-
scribers are forced to pay their financial commitments to CSPs without having
an in-depth QoS reconciliation. Figure 2.3 gives another narrative that how a
cloud provisioned service should ideally be monitored at CSS’s platform. This
is a shared privilege that should principally be offered by the CSP. Bringing
the peace of mind for the service recipient, so they can fully understand and
justify the service fairness against the money they have paid to the CSP,
using some sort of Business to Business (B2B) Payment Systems for each
term. The chapter contents also elaborate, fair exchange protocol and its
capabilities how it can handle SLA enforcement. Various researchers ad-
dressed the issue in context of SLA monitoring, detection and reporting such
as [46, 71, 121, 136, 149, 151, 163]. Most of the work whirls around SLA
monitoring and violation detection mechanisms. Rest [76] proposed a broader
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picture by discussing various scenarios while two entities are interacting under
fair exchange protocols. Their work motivates our work to consider end-to-end
protocol automation minimizing the participant’s interaction without com-
promising a claimant’s integrity.
[178] further demonstrates collection of SLA specifications.[49, 214] ad-
vocated idea of involving trusted third party(TTP) /auditors who can act as
unbiased entities. Finally other approaches were introduced by [1, 201, 209]
who used blockchain to manage SLA. Our research takes the narrative to an
extra mile by by showcasing how fair exchange protocol can be employed for
this purpose. Although our conceptual model presented the protocol’s initial
phases however upon presenting the next phase of our protocol research we
extended participant’s scenario from loss averse to malicious by considering
“data security and privacy comes first”. To consider various security and privacy
arrangements such as secure co-processor(trusted modules)[25, 49, 51, 78, 80] ,
Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes (FHES) [69, 119, 122, 134, 164] and
append-only database [64, 94, 155, 198] were consulted to additional security
and privacy layers within our proposed protocol to minimize any potential
vulnerabilities.
After embedding various strategic technical security and operational fea-
tures, we introduce novel architectures which facilitate and intelligently enforce
exchange fairness. Its early capabilities towards SLA verification, validation,
monitoring, traceable forensics auditing, violation detection, prevention, pri-
vacy, and anti-tampering might hold some teething problems and of course,
open to a lot of refinements yet the architecture is there to enforce trusted
service treaties among multi-parties cloud service exchange. The proposed
work also manifests some critical gaps which were noticed in the previous work
and facilitates parties to consider a doable trusted solution with full confidence.
This chapter was intended to explore how web services work, their basic
architecture, a service life cycle. It also touched what is the significance of a
provisioned web service, associated KPI’s and SLA management. The fact how
CSPs monitor SLAs, how SLA violation occurs, and what are the implications
of such service failure or poor service delivery. SLA monitoring, detection, and
prevention methodologies were reviewed to highlight the gap. We also analyzed
what other researchers proposed in terms of meeting SLA requirements using
various techniques and how we believe that SLA enforcement is a fair exchange
problem.
Our next chapter examines fair exchange protocols and their various types.
It also assesses the protocol’s suitability and how it works with or without
trusted third parties and trusted authorities alike. It highlights potential
constraints, communication overheads, and resilience along with their varying
24
properties if implemented to enforce SLA and how would it benefit both the




Marvels of cloud computing have been enabling pretty many businesses all over
the globe. These features such as on-demand, flexible, instant provisioning,
and cost-effectiveness serve smartly integrating within business processes. CC
services have made online trading so adaptable for either public or private
sectors that these enterprises have motivated others to integrate with these
technologies. Digital commerce shows a significant boom to retail e-commerce
sales worldwide, touching US$3.53tn[192]. During the pandemic situation, tech-
nology based trading has connected unprecedented buyers are being attracted
to shop online for all sort of goods and services. Enterprises have also been
in the same race when they seeking some outsourcing either aiming between
business to business(b2b) or business to consumer(b2c) services.
When some business functionalities require out-of-the-scope tasks which
warrants extra overheads, costs and cannot be delegated internally, service
outsourcing simplifies such task handling. Outsourcing is carried out on the
basis that interacting entities work within their own trust boundaries and their
financial gains are not shared whatsoever e.g. between the service provider or
service subscriber. In case a business entity causes any damages then liabilities
are claimed in accordance with their service contract, legal, or regulatory
framework [31].
While a huge number of online business contracts do take place, service
providers and service subscribers do often observe some service delivery hiccups.
These hurdles may arise either due to someone’s fault, something’s fault or
a fault may be inflicted by an attacker who may want to disrupt or fail the
business process for a number of reasons. Similarly, while the service delivery
is being carried out, either the service provider or the service subscriber may
face an awful situation when the other participant is not satisfying the business
expectations written in the terms and conditions on their contract. A mis-
behaving party can try to cut the corner to earn some advantages (financial,
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technical, or operational) using unfair means.
During such a situation where business cannot pledge 100% trust in other
counterparts, it becomes really difficult and challenging to avoid any losses,
if a lot of mitigation steps are not taken. A service provider is fully paid, he
might try some techniques to trick the buyer. Using such methods they can
perhaps save money or resources. This might correlate a situation when a
fraudster uses Salami Techniques [68] which does not deprive others with huge
notable chunks at once but such fraudster gradually steals a very small amount
which goes undetected by the victim so at the end of the game the fraudster
could pocket a huge sum. This is the point where the economic fairness gets
compromised and hit hard the suffering entity.
Cloud computing on one side accommodates such economic growth using
its cutting edge technologies and on the flipside raises a lot of constraints that
collide with economical ethics, best practices, regulatory requirements. Such
corporate level cheating on agreed contracts leaves an irreversible business
impact on the victim party. CSS, who is in a need of provisioning some instant,
on-demand cloud resources contacts the CSP, who offers their services for this
purpose. The cloud service subscriber pays the CSP upfront. CSP on the
other end doesn’t comply with their commitments at all or they do but the
level of the service e.g. QoS is too poor and is not acceptable to the CSS, who
demands some kind of compensation. A party believes that they have not
been delivered their due electronic items/services whereas another participant
can claim they did it because they have not been paid in full. There are also
chances that both of them are honest, there also chances one of them isn’t and
attempts to cheat the other. Prospects are also there when someone with some
malicious intent trying to attack them stealthily.
Performing a secure exchange on where betrayal and distrust are ever
expected especially using untrusted operating platforms(nodes, links), certainly
warrants a robust protocol, which ensures an end to end fairness and also
capable of resolving any disputes among buyers and sellers with the least
overheads and shortest possible time frame. This research work focuses on
examining such solutions and strongly believes that it relates to the problem
of Fair Exchange.
3.1 Fair Exchange Protocol (FEP)
The term fairness has been used within economic and legal domains for quite
some time ago. It narrates some obvious implications towards defining and
justifying how the sense of fairness is being maintained while multiple parties
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involved with some communal contractual (verbal/written) commercial ex-
change (goods/services). The outcome of such formalized trading activity may
decide the economic fate either for both the parties been involved, if both are
honest or if either of them or both are dishonest. It certainly goes against the
party (victimize) who acted honestly, however, the party acted another way
around to have a bigger slice, using some dishonest maneuvers which deprives
the honest participants.
Fair Exchange Protocol (FEP) has been well known on security protocol on
the horizon perhaps since the commercial trading commenced. The protocol’s
implementation has also been carried out either formally or informally, through
a verbal agreement or as in a written contract to maintain the segregation of
services, expectation, performance, length of service, quality of service, and
much more. Contracts based upon FEP must have had some sort of elements
stating agreements, disagreements, authorization, unauthorized, approved,
non-approved, or other similar economic factors to protect each party. We will
be discussing and exploring the FEP, in terms, its definitions, scope, types, op-
erating environments, components, participants, architecture, communication
channels, interactions, and how it relates to the modern-day service exchange
specifically when exchanging digital items (goods/services) online has become
a norm.
The work will also be touching the fact that how FEP is associated with the
cybersecurity domain and its significance when innovative economic activities
are at their boom using secure but ”vulnerable” hostile operating platforms
and so-called trusted but ”untrusted” where attackers are ever ready and
clever than ever so to exploit these channels to gain their malicious intents
which could be for financial or state-sponsored reasons. Our work will also
demonstrate that business participants while trading interactively could well
be loss averse, however, some of the exchange elements could affect their fair
exchange. The review would also navigate through to the fact that it’s won’t
take too long for an honest business participant to become dishonest to earn
unsolicited huge financial gains by depriving others business partners who put
their trust in them.
3.1.1 Defining Fairness
The fair exchange was nicely discussed by an academic who suggests that before
setting up a contract, each participant can evaluate the work performance
worth for them offered by others if they are considering some exchange. Fairness
of exchange is well justified, if both parties (buyers/sellers) acknowledge their
items then, the exchange must, by definition, be fair. Committing some sort of
28
exchange accountability which proves performance and promises at the end
of the contract that, it must be assumed about each party is content with his
bargain, or he would not have made it[24]. [161] narrates some assumptions
and the possibility of achieving the fairness element if those assumptions are
relaxed while two participants are exchanging their secrets. [196] raises the
concern how a misbehaving party can halt the exchange by taking advantage.
For a wide range of applications, such as contract signing and e-commerce,
where participants require an item from another participant, a problem called
fair exchange needs to be solved. A fair exchange protocol guarantees that no
honest participant will be at a disadvantage should another participant decides
to behave maliciously. Intuitively, a protocol is deemed fair if no misbehaving
participant in the protocol can gain an advantage over other (honest) parti-
cipants. For example, a protocol in which two participants exchange one item
for another is fair if it guarantees that either each party receives the item it
expects, or neither receives any information about the other’s item at the end
of the exchange [21]. Such a property is typically termed as atomicity. This
type of protocol is known as fair exchange protocols.
Fair exchange protocols are used for applications that require an exchange
of items. Example abound: (i) online payment systems [41, 53], in which a
payment is made in exchange for an item of value, (i) contract signing [21],
[32], in which the two parties exchange commitments to a contractual text,
certified electronic mail [22, 26, 63, 218] among others.
There are several categories of fair exchange protocols, which are:
• Gradual exchange protocols [32, 43]: This type of protocols works by
having the parties release their items in small installments (i.e., gradually),
to ensure that the amount of knowledge on both sides is approximately
the same at all times during the protocol execution. This means that,
typically, no party has an advantage over the other. Of course, because
the release is gradual, such protocols suffer from a large number of
communication steps. Gradual exchange protocols are also not suitable
is situations, where the items to be exchanged, have a “threshold” value
(i.e., the item may be valuable or not).
• The second class of fair exchange protocols works on the premise of
the existence of a trusted third party in the system [63, 218], which
also addresses the threshold problem. The trusted third party typically
monitors the communication between the protocol participants, ensuring
that no participant receives the item it wants before releasing its item,
ensuring fairness. The main disadvantage of the trusted third-party
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solution is that, as it monitors all communication steps, it may become
the communication bottleneck if it has to be involved in all instances of
the protocol to guarantee fairness. Variations of this approach include
fair exchange protocols with a semi-trusted third party [79].
• To address the communication bottleneck of trusted third parties, a class
of protocols have been proposed for what is known as optimistic fair
exchange [21, 28]. While these protocols still require a trusted third
party, the third party is only needed when there exist deviations from the
normal protocol execution such as when messages are delayed or one of
the parties misbehaves. In short, the trusted third party is only involved
when problems exist in the system.
A typical specification for a fair exchange problem consists of the following
properties [10]:
• Effectiveness: If the protocol is executed properly with the parties A and
B being honest participants, then both parties will have each other’s
items at the end of the protocol execution.
• Timeliness: The protocol will complete infinite time.
• Fairness: There are two flavors of fairness: (i) strong fairness states that,
at the end of the protocol, either both parties receive the expected item
from the other party or no party gains the expected item, or (ii) weak
fairness states that at the end of the protocol, either strong fairness is
satisfied or the honest party that do not receive the expected item does
not lose out, i.e., not receive the expected item.
• Non-repudiation: After a protocol run, each participant P will be able to
prove the origin of the item it has received and prove that P ’s protocol
counterparty has received P ’s authenticator.
FEP classifies fairness as strong when both the exchange participants receive
each other’s item or none do. Such scenarios establish the level of confidence
among the exchange participants because of the minimal risks [20, 81]
FEP is supposed to be weak when either of the exchange participants does
not receive the other’s item but can prove(to authority) that either the other
participant has received their item or they can receive the same without any
further assistance from the victimized participant, it would be weak fairness.
This scenario facilitates dispute resolutions through enforcement mechanisms.
Weak fairness is especially important as it allows an honest participant to
initiate a post-exchange dispute resolution in the case it has not received the
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expected item. As such, protocols that guarantee weak fairness will make use
of a trusted third party (TTP) to help with dispute resolution[20, 81].
Several protocols that solve the fair exchange problem have been proposed
in the literature; for the reason of completeness, we provide one from [76], that
includes a post-exchange dispute resolution phase. The protocol is found in
Table 5.1. More details about the protocol, including proofs of correctness, can
be found in [76].
The fair exchange protocol in Table 5.1 consists of three interdependent
subprotocols: (i) a normal exchange protocol (E), (ii) an abort protocol (A)
and (iii) a resolve protocol (R). The CSP and the CSS start the exchange by
executing the exchange (E) subprotocol. If they are both honest (and as the
system is synchronous), then they will exchange the items after the end of the
exchange protocol. If, for example, one participant is delayed in replying to a
message (i.e., violates timeliness assumptions), then the other participant may
execute the abort protocol (A). On the other hand, if the item received by one
of the parties is not according to the agreed description, then that participant
will execute the resolve (R) protocol. Note that an occasional violation of
synchrony assumption leads to either the execution of the resolve or abort
sub-protocol. In the latter outcome, as in transactions, enforcement can still
be done through re-execution or dispute resolution through TTP. Thus, the
fair-exchange based approach effectively facilitates automated enforcement of
SLA violations.
Table 3.1 gives a bird’s eye view covering some fair exchange protocols
along with their obliged service scope, properties, dispute handling capabilities,
trusted third party involvement, trusted authorities/ certificate authorities, and
their deployment. This brief analysis presents a good picture, entailing FEP
trends and what potential compromises a deployment would face achieving
most features such as fairness, timeliness, effectiveness, non-repudiation, and
service overheads. To compare these protocols with ours, we have also extended
the study to understand that how previously introduced FEPs can support
forensics investigation in case low-level message exchange logs are warranted
to resolve a dispute between the CSS and CSP, in the presence of TTP and
their coordinating TAs.
Chapter 4, examines system models and fault models representing the cloud
computing environment. It further explains that how processes, links, and
business entities can act while they are employing digital services against some
monetary commitments. Their behavioral analysis can lead them towards
either loss aversion or participants could act maliciously. Fault models do help
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































System and Fault Models
4.1 System and Fault Models
System and fault modeling is a technique which lets one evaluate, various
kind of system failures such as defects(imperfections in the infrastructure),
faults(imperfection of some functionalities), errors(an incorrect system beha-
viour) and failures(deviation of a specified behaviour). Critically reviewing
a system model against its corresponding fault models, surely opens various
corridors to fix those problems, and also it methodically assists to have detailed
assessments of those fault points and their most appropriate mitigation and
improvement approaches. In a testing scenario, a system model may include
participating entities in their good operating state with some fundamental
implementation configurations. Fault model, on the flip side, discovers poten-
tial fault points, from the beginning of the process till the endpoint, showing
potential misbehaviours of a single node or a distributed computing cluster.
That’s system-level fault identification and fault points are analyzed through
the chain of events. [72, 159]. This chapter presents some thoughts by dis-
cussing our prescribed system model, fault model scenarios covering both our
proposed architectures for enforcing cloud SLAs, hence, it also constructs an
overall security posture to correlates enforcement elements. This research
further extends by evaluating every main component of said architectures
by furnishing mitigations schemes for discovered problems and constraints.
Following we present these models, we assume in the published paper.
4.1.1 When Participants are Loss Averse
The following discussion covers our first proposed architecture, which addresses
a use case when interacting participants are classified as loss averse as explained
in the Chapter 5, who interact through a synchronous communication model.
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System Model
Within distributed computing, a system model consists of all the participating
nodes, processors, processes, and their associated components interactively
communicating with each other in various operating environments. Their
coordinated communication facilitates performing a task such as (a client’s)
service request initiated by one of the expected processors who is a member
of a known network coming from either a trusted or untrusted network. The
system model also illustrates some algorithms or protocols under which at least
two or more interactive participants agree on their interaction cycle that how
their communication will set up, initiated, task performance, and expected
behaviours and terminations, once the tasks are completed. Issues related to
fault tolerance and dispute resolution are also put in place within the service
reference architecture. It facilitates review of the message exchange or expected
communication pattern, timing model when participating nodes are interacting
with each other regardless of their service distribution span.
The system model also reviews every component functionality as expected
and their obligatory behaviour when working in an ideal environment. Evaluat-
ing how long a process takes a time for execution and complete the task depends
if the system is set for running those tasks on either an asynchronous and
synchronous communication models as both have their operating implications
[52, 116]. Further elaborating the fact, our chosen communication model is
synchronous therefore upcoming interactions will be reviewed under the same
assumptions. Synchronous systems do depend on real-time so to communicate
with correct processors[54].
We assume a system with three parties: (i) the cloud service subscriber
(CSS), (ii) the cloud service provider (CSP), and (iii) the end-users.
CSS: The cloud service subscriber is an entity (e.g., individual, company,
government agency) that requires computational resources such as processing
power and/or storage. The number of resources required by the CSS will be
determined by the application workload that the CSS will be expecting for its
business requirements. In return for these computational resources (and other
associated services, such as disaster recovery), the CSS will provide an item
such as digital payment in return. The amount of computational resources
required by a given CSS is dictated by the application or business requirement
of the CSS. For a given CSS, we denote its application requirements by A,
which contains a set of (business or application) parameters such as availability
and response times among others, together with desired values. We assume
that A can be translated into the corresponding resource requirements R that




















Figure 4.1: A basic Web Service Operating state
[35]
onto a relevant R. We assume that the CSS has a function E that takes a set
of metrics (or sensors) S from the CSP to determine whether E(S) satisfies
A. We also denote the item given by the CSS by ICSS . We assume that the
item ICSS satisfies some specification ΣICSS and that there exists a verification
procedure VICSS that can attest whether ICSS satisfies ΣICSS or not.
CSP: The CSP, at the lowest level, provides computational resources to one
or more CSSs. The CSP uses a variety of supporting techniques such as VM
migration [36, 183, 213], scheduling [113] and elastic resource provisioning [48]
to meet the resource requirements of every CSS requesting its services. The
exact CSP deployment is outside the scope of this paper. (To hint, given a
CSS and its application requirement A, the CSP needs to decide, based on
the resources it has available and its supporting techniques, whether it can
allocate R resources to A, e.g., see [75]). We assume that the CSP keeps
track of a set S of signals (or sensors) for the CSS which, together, captures
the performance of the CSP towards meeting A. Due to competing demands
from various CSS’s, a CSP may not always guarantee that their respective
requirements will be met at all times. To capture this aspect, the CSP provides
a corresponding SLA to the CSS, which we denote by SLA, that stipulates the
performance guarantees that the CSP provides to CSS. The SLA will proclaim
clauses for each application parameter of A. We refer to each clause as a
(parameter) predicate. When any such predicate is violated (after evaluation
by E), the CSS may escalate remedial action to the CSP, which is captured in
SLA. We assume that, periodically, the CSP pushes the value of S to the CSS
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for evaluation.
Message Security: Arrangements & Schemes While discussing the
system model it will be nice to review and explore some of the supporting
technologies protecting (e.g. data security and privacy) message exchange
channels and act as mandatory security implementation. This becomes even
more critical for parties to review how their service providers do care about
security threats, attacks, and other aspects to ensure secure service delivery to
their client’s platforms.
Cryptographic Primitives Cryptography is one of the prime elements
when ensuring communication security to/from untrusted channels. Surely,
without implementing cryptographic schemes data security and privacy can
never be guaranteed. Furthermore, these security methodologies do serve
security elements such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation. The same has been adopted in our work so while assuming
message exchange or other party communications, our protocols do rely on
cryptographic primitives therefore, the thesis does require to shed some light
on various cryptographic schemes and how they encrypt and decrypt messages.
A message is encrypted when a rendering process is implemented on some
intended data which makes that data unusable (e.g.no one else can read except
the intended users/ recipients). These schemes prevent unauthorized actors to
read that information being sent/ receive (data at rest, data in transit). An
attacker can even access the encrypted data, they cannot decrypt it until they
have access to appropriate cryptographic keys [200]. This message transforma-
tion from plaintext to ciphertext where the order of message bits are scrambled
to make it unreadable for unintended and unauthorized users until the attacker
can attempt by reverse engineering those encryption rules and cryptosystems.
There are few techniques, we will be reviewing to understand the protocol
communication and security assumption when advancing the participant’s
inter-communications arrangements. Table 4.1 presents various schemes along
with their attributes and objectives [187, 200]
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Symmetric Encryption The symmetric key encryption method also known
as secret key encryption, uses a single secret key for both the sender and the
recipient during the intended message exchange so to perform both encryption
and decryption, using the same key. The message sending entity encrypts
the message using this key and the recipient on the other end decrypts the
received encrypted message uses the same key to decrypt it using some back-end
mathematical hashing functionality. The security concern for implementing
this method is not very reliable as if the secret key which needs to be shared
with the receiving party, can be intercepted maliciously by some attacker, the
security and the integrity of the message may compromise[200]
There are some algorithms known to the Symmetric family as Tiny En-
cryption Algorithm TEA, Data Encryption Standard DES, International Data
Encryption Algorithm IDEA, RC4 and Advance Encryption Standard AES.
Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithms This methodology which is also
known as public key encryption uses a different scheme for encryption and
decryption such that a message can be encrypted by user A by using user B’s
public key (might be known to others e.g. unauthorized users) and the message
is dispatched to user B. In terms of decrypting the message, user B has to
use their private key(only known to user B, not to anyone else) otherwise, a
message if may be intercepted by a middle attacker, they cannot be able to
read it as they don’t hold a private key from user B. The basis on one-way
functionality uses an approved mathematical operation which calculates such
values with a combination of inputs, however, it is impossible to regenerate
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the input values again. Diffie-Hellman and RSA are well known to this family.
After reviewing various studies such as [145, 154, 175], and other researchers
such as [23, 27, 67, 125, 150, 205] who have mainly worked used this algorithm,
also [182] survey shows that RSA is the most appropriate algorithm to work
within the cloud computing environments, therefore, our chosen algorithm for
the context of our research will be based on RSA algorithm.
Hybrid cryptographic Methods Usage of Hybrid Cryptographic algorithms
are another emerging idea specifically for e-commerce, such introducing a com-
bination of a symmetric key algorithm of AES and the asymmetric key algorithm
[107] and another variance [117] introduces hybrid cryptographic combo with
two different symmetric algorithm using simple integer variables and extended
linear block cipher to ensure integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity while
the participants are interacting online.
Digital Signatures Digital Signatures: Digital signature is a compiled hash
value that is signed by the message senders using their private key, which
ensures the message’s integrity. The industry has been using strong digital
signatures on various digital products. When dealing with sensitive items or
online transactions, signing them digitally adds surety about its protection
in terms of message integrity and non-repudiation and authentication will be
maintained between senders and receivers. The significance of digital signatures
certifies data exchange is trustworthy as the message exchange gets back and
forth on untrusted channels. A digitally signed piece of work is intuitive puts
incredible challenges to the attackers although in terms of attempting some
arbitrary modifications to the data, however, scenarios like double spendings
[52, 93].
Non-cryptographic Methods Other significant security measures on top of
cryptographic algorithms are traffic padding, routing control, passwords, smart
cards, protected channels, and then other obvious security arrangements such
as firewall are also implemented to ensure channel security [120].
Nonce is a one-time usage integer value that is included in the message
sequence to demonstrate the message is not a repetitive message. Nonce puts
another security layer for an authentic message to be used again by the attacker
as replay attack.
Digest Functions are also known as secure hash functions and some time
they are denoted as H(M). The fact while reviewing in a message exchange
both H(M)6=H(M’) needs to be highlighted and should be treated as modified
message, while the participants were interacting [174].
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RSA
No doubt that in recent years RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) [37]
has been proved itself as the industry’s de-facto cryptographic algorithm when
implementing public-key(asymmetric) cryptography. It does not only support
the protocol’s authentication requirements but also performs encryption core
functionalities. Following explain the basic encryption and decryption process
in following steps where performs key generation, encrypts the intended data
and finally decrypts it: [52, 154]
1. A Message Sender(A) intends to send a message to a recipient (B) so he
generates a key pair KpubA and KprivA. The public key KpubA is published
in a desirable secure location.
2. Now (A) computes a digest of message M as M, H(M) using approved
some secure hash function and performs the encryption using his private
key KprivA so to get message signature (S) as S=H(M)KprivA
3. Sender (A) dispatch the intended encrypted message as [M]K=M, S to
the message recipient (B) through untrusted communication channels.
4. (B) performs the message decryption function on S through KpubA and
computes the message digest of M, H(M), if both matches, the signature
of the message can be classed as valid.
Despite being a well-reputed encryption algorithm for quite some time,
RSA still has got few security concerns such there are chances that the entire
data can entirely be decrypted if an attacker can get hold of the private key.
This threat can only be mitigated with algorithms supporting forward secrecy
feature such as Diffe-Hellman Encryption(DHE) however, DHE got its issue
such as its speed. Another best option would be implementing Ephemeral
Elliptic Curve DHE (ECDHE-RSA) is on asymmetric encryption catalog which
is robust and fast [123, 173].
Digital Certificates & Certificate Authorities (CAs)
Digital certificates offer an assurance that they are the legit parties to
whom the communication is being carried out. Digital certificates hold public
keys and some identification followed best practices or some global standards
of a remote user, which by repelling attackers and unauthorized users for being
impersonating. A certificate may include a version of X.509 (maintained by
International Telecommunications Union) certificate’s serial number, signature
algorithm identifier issuer name, validity period, subject’s name, and subject’s
public key which proves a good acceptable identification. Certificates are issued
by certificate authorities (CA). Such organizations offer digital notary services
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to interested parties so they can get digital certificates only from approved
CAs [93].
Fault Model
Fault models are developed to forestall an operating situation where either
one or more system participating nodes, processors, processes, links, or any
of the contributing service components may fail, due to multiple internal or
external factors. This outcome due to such faults can end up calculating and
presenting inaccurate processing times, (system, process, verification)values,
falsified specifications. Such faults may also interfere with system security
configurations and infringement of user access, authorization, or any other
aspect which demonstrate as some sort of arbitrary action from one of the
serving nodes [108]. Further analysis discussing such failures [92] well describes
by detailing about e.g. omission (process/communication channel)failures,
arbitrary byzantine failures, and timing failures on top of those which are
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Figure 4.2: Potential attackers could cause failure to a web service operation
[35, 73, 140]
Focusing on the core web technologies where web services are interacted
such as published, accesses, or even attacked, security measures are put in
place to ensures:
Message Securitya) Infrastructure Securityb)
Correct Response Generationc) Authentic Recipient Onlyd)
Interaction Complies the SLAe) Repel Attackers (internal/external)f)
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A SLA violation alert can be triggered if one of the service elements on
CSP’s provisioned services based upon either IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS environments,
as mentioned in Table 2.1 are compromised
The fault model we assume in our published paper refers to those faults
which can cause a CSP to be unable to fulfill its SLA concerning the CSS, i.e.,
we focus on faults that cause E(S) to violate A. This could be due to a failure
of the CSP’s supporting techniques (i.e., design faults) or its misconfigured
resource provisioning (i.e., component faults) or even it could be due to a
malicious attack (i.e., external abuse) such as a distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks. Of interest here are the manifestations of such faults, i.e.,
SLA violations.
We also assume the CSS and CSP to be loss averse. A participant (CSS or
CSP) is loss averse if (i) he does not attempt to subvert the execution of the
protocol, (ii) if the participant is a CSS, then the participant always correctly
evaluate E(S), i.e., the CSS does not falsely accuse the CSP of violating the
SLA and (iii) if the participant is a CSP, then the CSP always agrees to
the remedial action specified in SLA when the SLA has been violated. The
reason for a loss-averse participant is that (i) as a CSP, a bad reputation may
negatively affect its business plan, and (ii) as a CSS, wrongful accusations may
lead to reduced availability due to the time for violation resolution.
Nodes and Network: We assume that the node on which the CSS executes is
reliable, i.e., the CSS always can monitor the performance of the CSP. We also
assume that the clocks of the CSS node are synchronized to real-time within a
known bound. WLOG, we assume the bound to be 0 for simplicity. Further,
since we focus on faults and attacks that affect the CSP, we assume that the
network is reliable, i.e., the delay between the CSP and CSS is bounded and
the delay between CSP and end-users is bounded too. In short, we assume the
system to be synchronous.
4.1.2 When Participants are Malicious
In the above-mentioned scenarios, the scope of our system and fault model was
only limited to three participants e.g. CSS, CSP, and the end user however, as
we extend our protocol operating assumptions hence the number of participants
are also increased in this interaction. Now we other participants as some of
them are well connected as they do interact directly with each other whereas
some of them do act as either on behalf of the front-line actors such as CSP
or CSS. Those extended participants are trusted third parties (TTP), trusted
authorities (TAs). These trusted authorities act as guarantors on behalf of
those entities who have outsourced them for this purpose. TACSS and TACSP
are obliged and given a specific mandate to interact with TTP when they do
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esquire or ask to submit their items, pledged by either CSS or CSP. Therefore,
the dimension and the scope of our system model and fault model will take a
slight shift including these participants. Most of the above-mentioned operating
constraints may be the same, however, due to some obvious changes in our
architecture and other interacting scenarios, the scope of the fault model will
ultimately be extended.
Threat Landscape The SLA violation occurs when one of the deployed web
services either gets compromised by a malicious actor. It could be either
someone internal/external attacker or something(e.g. a modified process,
breached security) which can jeopardize either a service component or the entire
service can be down. In our research scope faults can be occurred within CSP’s
trust boundary, CSS’s trust boundary, or on one of the communication channel,
they are interacting with.
Cloud Attack Vectors Cloud migration has seriously accelerated through
the globe, regardless of business size, nature, or service scope. During the recent
pandemic era, decision-makers would make cloud-based technologies their first
and far most choice, which facilitate them a least maintained service plat-
form with the excellence of resilience, security, and compliance. Entire global
business has become fully dependent on cloud technologies where the supply
chain management relentlessly collaborates international trading, education,
shipping, health, financial technologies(fintech), food processing, Wholesale
and Retail Trade, and of course manufacturing sector when access to the
workplaces have been restricted. To run these sectors hosting technologies
been constantly moving towards cloud data centers, where these cloud service
providers revenue growth would dramatically increase touching $304.9 billion
figure in 2021, with software as a service (SaaS) holds the top position as the
largest service element [191].
This depicts the global business reliance on cloud technologies, which
unfortunately also attracts bad actors, regardless if they reside within the
trusted boundaries or outside the trusted boundaries. Their aim to ceased
targetted cloud services in one way or the other by employing various attacking
tools and paths. Confidentiality, integrity and availability attack vectors
are designed and target [97] critical data(residual or wired), edge computing
infrastructure(physical or virtual) or even endpoints. This poses constant
security risks to those who are either cloud security service providers or service
subscribers. Diversified threat perception can cripple security arrangements and
bring a business down to its knees if one of its critical services is compromised.
Attack vectors demonstrate their capabilities to an extent that could cause
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cloud service outage in the worst scenario. Such ferocious attacks could also
cause human lives when health [156] or aviation services [50] are attacked by
unknown attackers. SLA compliance and other service monitoring implications
would act as double damage when the service outages[88, 170] are waged
through these attacks and the service subscriber cannot even prove their claims
in these circumstances.
There is a variety of attack vectors which malicious attackers can launch
aiming web attacks, application attacks, infrastructure attacks [9, 38, 210]. We
can further distinguish such attack vector by service models such as attack
targeting SaaS cloud [141], PaaS cloud [215] and attacks impacting IaaS
platforms[147, 166, 206].
For the cloud service deployment, the scope of security should consider how
data service classification and accountability are arranged. Depending upon the
service deployment further threat avenues would also be reviewed before signing
the SLA. This would include but is not limited to client & end-point security,
service access controls and hosting platform security, marking and agreeing
with the responsibility zones. Some of those attacks are being highlighted here
:-
Denial of Service (DoS) Attacksa) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Attacks
b)
Cloud Malware-Injection Attacksc) Cloud Side Channel Attacksd)
Authentication Attackse) Man-in-the-Middle Attacksf)
Trust & Reputation System At-
tack
g) Cloud Service Containers (DDoS)
Attack
h)
Metadata Spoofing Attacks (WSDL
service modification)
i) Server-side Request Forgeryj)
Credential Stuffing Attackk) Fake Cloud Servicesl)
Chapter 4 discusses system models and fault models and talks about varying
service elements whether they belong to technical, operational, or security
domains. The chapter also highlights various mitigation options to those risk
factors when multi-party service exchange is being performed. We understood
how loss aversion would interfere with these business participants and the
dispute handling issues. The chapter also discusses those scenarios when either
the participant or even both could act maliciously with diverse cloud-based
attacks. Our next chapter explains how our proposed conceptual model works,
how it initiates message exchange in the active presence of trusted third parties.
43
The chapter reviews every single message exchange right from the beginning




SLA Enforcement with Loss
Averse Participants
Loss aversion is an economic behavioural condition which indicates when a
business entity prefers a business state of no profit no loss, rather then earning
such profit which could end up paying them a greater cost in terms of fines,
penalties, reputation through media trial, criminal investigation or even court
cases. Their sensitivity about avoiding losses is greater value over earning
some predicted business profit. This economic move temporarily convince an
entity to chose potential negative outcomes over positive outcomes through
business gain [110, 126, 204]. On the same note, our first intended scenario is
the one, where are both our prime business partners are strong believers of
the loss averse theory. Either the cloud service provider who is selling their
digital products for cloud environments or the cloud service subscriber who is
the potential customer for these digital items would utmost stick to the fact,
where they do not reach into a cheating state. Furthermore, the cloud service
provider would surely act with full honesty when provisioning cloud services to
the cloud service subscriber and would not cheat the CSS such as interfering
with their data security, privacy or by making any move which qualifies as a act
of misbehavior. Similarly, CSS on the other end would not demonstrate any
act such not paying the service provider or not interfering any of the product
or service security arrangements, which can be correlated as malicious act.
This research work first highlights the problem and indicates those gaps
within the existing cloud service delivery. Related system and fault models,
were also discussed in the previous chapter 4 in the first half stating those
scenarios how system models work and what happens when potential faults are
injected. This leads the research work to propose an architecture that resolves
the problem. We suggested that this problem belongs to the fair exchange
where SLA enforcement has been a big issue. Previously, the work was mainly
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focused on SLA violations and their monitoring aspects. We understand that an
intelligent solution is the strategic business need when cloud SLA enforcement
is not only monitored, detected but should also be enforced automatically. To
the best of our knowledge, the fair exchange protocol has not been considered
for this purpose as we did in [160]. This research work presented not only
theoretical implications of this suggested architecture but also enclosed with
a micro-level implementation using concurrent cloud technologies where the
architecture was tested and results were obtained too. Furthermore, we also
present details where both the logical and the physical implementation shows
how the architecture works and enforces the SLA while using an inline trusted
third party (TTP) who governs the entire service exchange as sub-contracted
by both the CSP and the CSS, leaving least chances of any misbehaviour and
loss of fairness from an end to end service transition within the contractual
service delivery term.
5.1 Proposed Methodology
Cloud computing (CC) is becoming increasingly important as the economic
and technological benefits of such a computing paradigm are evident, with a
rising number of cloud service providers (CSPs) offering diverse cloud-enabled
services. The growing number of cloud service subscribers (CSSs), due to fringe
benefits e.g. disaster recovery or flexible resource availability, seek service
guarantees from CSPs regarding the quality of service (QoS) they expect to
improve their business case.
An SLA is a primary source to quantify QoS. It originally serves as both
a service blueprint and as a warranty for the CC. Such SLAs contain many
different clauses that address issues such as (i) ownership of data (e.g., Access
to the data - data retrievable from CSP in readable format), (ii) the specific
parameters and minimum service (e.g., Availability (e.g. 99.99% (peak), 99.9%
for (off-peak) times or Performance (e.g. maximum response times)) (iii)
system architecture and security levels or standards (e.g., Security / privacy of
the data (e.g. encrypting all stored and transmitted data or disaster recovery
expectations (e.g. worse case recovery commitment), (iv) the costs associated
with each level of service, and finally (v) each element of the service, as well
as remedies for failure to meet those requirements (e.g., dispute mediation
process (e.g. escalation process, consequences)). Thus, the SLA captures the
guarantees the CSP provides to the CSS, who in turn lease the services against
monetary commitments.
However, the system architecture that supports various CC services is
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such that it can be (i) subjected to failures, i.e., nodes can crash or be taken
offline [12] or (ii) it could fail due to targeted cyber attacks [85, 133]. In
these circumstances, the economic impact is often significant to businesses and
usually, the CSP breaches its SLA. The clause in the SLA that addresses SLA
violation is then activated. Eventually, the CSS, being the penalized party,
may seek some form of business reimbursements, as mentioned in the SLA.
A manual dispute mediation process could take longer than anticipated to
resolve the dispute among participants. Due to restricted access on CSP’s
computing estate, a CSS is surprisingly held liable for a failed cloud service,
when they cannot even produce a piece of evidence. The CSS ultimately needs
to adhere to some well-defined procedures: e.g. robustly tracking all relevant
data, ensuring its admissibility and integrity (digital forensics soundness) is
fully intact[2].
To address the problem that the burden of proof rests with the CSP (with
all the steps that need to be adhered to), a move towards automating the
dispute resolution process will ease the CSP. This entity ensures that either of
the participants are not unfairly treated. In this published paper, I propose a
state-of-the-art solution based on the concept of fair exchange [21, 76].
In the presented paper, my main contribution was to propose a modular
architecture that uses the fair exchange problem to solve the SLA enforcement
problem. The proposed architecture is depicted in Figure 5.1.
5.1.1 Architecture Objective
In this section, we briefly explain the problem that we address in this paper
and subsequently enumerate the properties that a solution to the problem
needs to satisfy.
The cloud service fabric is mainly built around a service-oriented architec-
ture defined by the CSP. Typically, the CSS pays the CSP for some services at
stated times, i.e., periodically. An SLA is then drafted that contains clauses
that both CSP and CSS need to satisfy at all times, else remedial actions may
be taken against the violating party. The SLA is the only legal instrument
that holds the entire service plan, service scope, scalability, outages, and incid-
ent response mechanism between the CSP and the CSS. A service variation
e.g., under-provisioned services (in terms of pre-agreed number of processors,
memory, storage, bandwidth allocation & service uptime guarantees) could
negatively impact a CSS if users accessing the CSS’s application are delivered
unfair or degraded services by the CSP. We assume that the CSP keeps track
of a set of sensors that monitors the various SLA clauses. In such cases, the
CSS may wish for some form of compensation whenever the SLA is violated.
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To summarise, the scenario is as follows: The timeline is split into “windows”
or rounds of equal size (i.e., to capture the notion of the period). Then, close to
the end of round c, the CSP sends sensor readings gathered over round c to the
CSS. The sensor readings capture the various attributes related to the SLA. If
the SLA is satisfied, then the CSS pre-pays for cycle c+ 1. On the other hand,
if there is an SLA violation in round c, then the CSS can claim compensation
from the CSP (e.g., by duly reducing its pre-payment for cycle c+ 1 services).
Since a CSP is assumed to be loss-averse, it will compensate a CSS, so long as it
sees the evidence for its SLA violations essential for the CSS to be compensated.
Thus, the burden of proof, i.e., proving SLA violation, rests with the CSS
[30]. Such proofs may be very challenging to obtain or show, since the CSS
may not have all the required information. Even if a piece of evidence can be
found, the process is a manual one, resulting in a long and tedious process
that is detrimental to the CSS. Thus, it would be beneficial to the CSS if
this process of SLA enforcement is automated. Specifically, automation would
benefit all parties, with various evidence captured and presented as necessary.
So, SLA enforcement is formulated as a fair exchange in which CSP obtains
its pre-payment from a loss-averse CSS for cycle c+ 1 services if and only if it
has satisfied the agreed SLA for cycle c services. The fair exchange also has a
built-in dispute resolution mechanism: if SLA violations had indeed occurred
during c, then both the CSS and CSP receive a token of resolution wherein
SLA violations are verifiably acknowledged.
As such, the problem we solve in the paper, which we term as SLA En-
forcement, is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (SLA Enforcement). Given a SLA S that captures the following:
• A set of sensors at the CSP denoted by ICSP ,
• An item to “pay” the CSP denoted by ICSS,
• A specification ΣCSP that describes the range of allowable values of every
sensor in ICSP ,
• A specification ΣCSS that describes the range of allowable values for
ICSS,
• A verification procedure VICSP that verifies whether the value of every
sensor matches that specified by ΣCSP ,
• A verification procedure VICSS that verifies whether ICSS matches ΣCSS,
• A time period TE which captures the period over which the values of
sensors are valid,
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then a protocol A solves the SLA enforcement problem iff A satisfies the
following:
• Fairness: When A terminates, then either (i) CSP receives ICSS and
VCSS(ICSS) and CSS receives ICSP and VCSP (ICSP ) or (ii) if ¬VCSP (ICSP )
then CSP does not receive ICSS but both CSP and CSS receive a res-
olution token that also contains the SLA contract S between CSS and
CSP .
• Timeliness: A terminates no later than the time TE.
• Non-repudiation: When A terminates in (i), CSP is able to prove
independently that the origin of ICSS is CSS and CSS is able to prove
independently the origin of ICSP is CSP . If A terminates in (ii), both
CSP and CSS can prove independently the origin and content of their
resolution token.
5.1.2 Proposed Architecture
After learning the SLA enforcement problem and other associated gaps in
an abstract, a conceptual model was built as mentioned in the figure. This
conceptual model, which is initially based upon a service buyer(CSS) and the
service seller(CSP). These two participants form a two-party service exchange
model, their service orientation, is configured to synchronous communication
model with another key entity, the trusted third party(TTP) who monitors and
mediates their service exchange. Each event is bounded in synchronous com-
munication, therefore, responses are expected within a set time frame, before
an alarm is raised. Further, our algorithm explains that how this architecture,
handles the SLA enforcement by minimizing various challenges, security, and
those events associated with compromising exchange fairness. Specification of
each serving component such as SLA(E) and FE are also explained and their
interaction with their other counterparts is also demonstrated their seamless
interaction and responses accordingly.
The next ultimate task was, how this conceptual model is extended to
a working tested. We implementing it into the cloud environments such as
Microsoft Azure to see and record each entity’s behaviour. The reason for
this implementation was to analyze and verify how each node on the system
model interacts when configured system specifications, operating environments,
and in the presence of other constraints when we deploy CSS, CSP, and the
TTP as virtual entities. Following, we share those details and figures, which










Figure 5.1: Proposed Architecture(I) (when participants are loss averse)
implementation handles the service exchange for ensuring a robust and resilient
automated SLA enforcement.
Figure 5.1 shows the fair exchange component (i.e., a solution to the fair
exchange problem) providing services to an SLA enforcement component. The
idea is that the SLA enforcement component passes values or parameters to
the fair exchange component. Once the fair exchange components receive
the intended values, it executes the relevant subprotocol (i.e., normal, resolve
or abort) by forwarding the messages to the intended party, i.e., the TTP,
the CSP, or CSS. The fair exchange component at either the CSP or CSS is
responsible for ensuring that the exchange has taken place. For example, the
fair exchange component at CSS will ensure that the agreed set of sensors (i.e,
ICSP ) is delivered but it will be the SLA enforcement module that will verify
whether the sensor values (relayed by the fair exchange component) satisfy the
agreed SLA.
However, the SLA enforcement problem is challenging because, typically,
the CSS needs to “pay” upfront before the CSP provides services to the CSS.
In the case of dispute, the CSS needs to convince the CSP that there has
indeed been an SLA violation. Even in these cases, the CSP may disagree
with the CSS for a variety of reasons, e.g., denying the source of the evidence
(i.e., sensors). In such a case, the problem is the burden placed on the CSS.
Further, a typical fair exchange solution is symmetric, i.e., both parties start
the protocol at the same time by exchanging messages directly with each other,
and that these message exchanges do not involve the TTP in a successful
exchange or in a normal termination. On the other hand, the SLA problem is
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not symmetric as the CSS needs to pay upfront for future services, and the
CSP can return sensor values only towards the end of the time window for
ongoing service provisions.
5.1.3 Architectural Components
Our proposed architecture has got three participants involved and users, which
only causes the sensors at the CSP to be updated and do not participate in
the SLP enforcement problem. The three participants are (i) CSP, (ii) CSS
and (iii) TTP.
Table 5.1: Fair exchange protocol with post-exchange dispute resolution
Step Protocol Messages from/to PA Messages from/to PB
1 setup φ(A) = eKA(IA) φ(B) = eKB(IB)
2 E MA = eKB(L,A,H(N), φA) : MB = eKA(L,B,H(N), φB) :
PA → PB PB → PA
3 E AckA(B) =
(L,A,H(N), H(MB),my ack) :
AckB(A) =
(L,B,H(N), H(MA),my ack) :
PA → PB PB → PA




PA → TTP PB → TTP




PA → TTP PB → TTP
6 R MTTP (A) =
(L, TTP,H(N),MB,my ack) :
MTTP (B) =
(L, TTP,H(N),MA,my ack) :
TTP → PA TTP → PB
7 A AbortTTP (A) =
(L, TTP,H(N),Abort granted, A) :
AbortTTP (B) =
(L, TTP,H(N),Abort granted, B) :
TTP → PA TTP → PB
CSS and CSP
These two participants are those that require SLA enforcement. As such,
there are two important components at each of these two sites: (i) A SLA
enforcement (SLA-E) component, and (ii) a fair exchange (FE) component.
The SLA-E component forwards or receives SLA-related information to and
from the FE component, which is responsible for executing the fair exchange
problem. Using the protocol of Table 5.1 as a template, we will present our SLA
enforcement protocol in two ways: (i) information that flows between SLA-E
and FE, and (ii) the messages that the FEs exchange between themselves.
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Table 5.2: SLA Initialization
Step Messages from SLA-E to FE Messages from FE to SLA-E
1 ψCSS = SigCSS(S, VCSS) L (see Table 5.3)
ψCSP = SigCSP (S, VCSP ) L
Table 5.3: SLA Enforcement setup phase - Fair Exchange Component
Step Protocol Messages from/to CSS Messages from/to CSP
2 setup MSLA = (CSS,CSP, ψCSS) :
CSS → TTP
(CSP,CSS, ψCSP ) : CSP → TTP
3 setup SigTTP (CSS,CSP,H(N), L, TE) :
TTP → CSS
SigTTP (CSS,CSP,H(N), L, TE) :
TTP → CSP
TTP
Since the TTP is only responsible for enforcing the fair exchange problem, it
does not have an SLA-E component. So, whenever the TTP is involved in
message exchanges, it is the FE component that is responsible for the exchange.
5.1.4 SLA Enforcement Protocol
In this section, we explain the SLA enforcement protocol.
Initialization and Setup
We now explain the initialization protocol.
SLA-E, FE at CSS and CSP: Initially, both CSP and CSS need to send
the agreed SLA contract S to the TTP, who can keep it in-store, in case
of dispute resolution. To achieve this, the SLA enforcement component at
CSS (resp. CSP ) passes the following to the fair exchange component: (i)
S and (ii) VCSS (resp. VCSP ). The SLA enforcement component signs these
values (see Table 5.2) and passes them on to the fair exchange component.
When the fair exchange component receives these values, the fair exchange
component executes the setup protocol of Table 5.3. It includes a nonce in the
message, that uniquely identifies the current exchange “round”. At the end of
the execution, the fair exchange component receives a value L (step 1), which
is a label that links to the SLA S at the TTP, and L is passed on to the SLA
enforcement module.
FE at TTP: When the FE component TTP receives the messages from the
(FE components) CSS and CSP, it checks whether the two SLAs agree. If they
52
Table 5.4: Message Exchange Between SLA-E and FE during Normal Exchange
Step Messages from SLA-E to FE Messages from FE to SLA-E
4 at CSS - (L, TTP, φCSS = SigCSS(ICSS)) (L, φCSP )
at CSP - (L,CSS, φCSP = SigCSP (ICSP )) (L, φCSS)
5 at CSS - (L, TTP,CSP,my ack) (L,CSP, TE ,my ack)
at CSP - (L,CSS,my ack)
Table 5.5: Fair exchange protocol during normal exchange
Step Messages from/to CSS Messages from/to CSP
6 MCSS =
eKTTP (L,CSS,H(N), φCSS) :
MCSP =
eKCSS(L,CSP,H(N), φCSP ):
CSS → TTP CSP → CSS
7 AckCSS(TTP ) =
(L,CSS,H(N), H(MCSP ),my ack) :
AckTTP (CSP ) =
(L,CSP,H(N), φCSS ,my ack) :
CSS → TTP TTP → CSP
8 AckCSP (CSS) =
(L,CSP, TE , H(N), H(φCSS),my ack) :
CSP → CSS
do, then it returns a label L to both CSP and CSS that uniquely identifies the
SLA. In any future communication with the TTP, that label L needs to be
used to reference the SLA.
When the CSS and CSP receives the message from the TTP, their respective
FE component passes on the label L, as it is the only SLA-related data but
retains TE , which is the time window during which the exchange needs to
complete and was found in the SLA.
Successful Items Exchange
Table 5.6: Message Exchange Between SLA-E and FE during Dispute Resolu-
tion
Step Messages from SLA-E to FE Messages from FE to SLA-E
9 at CSS - (L, TTP,CSP, ψCSS) (L,CSP,H(N),S)
10 at CSP - (L,CSS,H(N),S) at CSP - (L, TTP,H(N), ψCSP )
Once the setup is complete, there is a round of items exchange. Typically,
TE may be a month, where the CSS renews its CSP subscription every month,
but we are not concerned with the exact value in this paper. After the
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Table 5.7: Fair Exchange Protocol during Dispute Resolution
Step Messages from/to CSS Messages from/to CSP
11 ResCSS(TTP ) =
(L,CSS,H(N),MCSS ,MCSP ,Resolve Req) :
ResTTP (CSP ) =
(L, TTP,H(N), ψCSP ,Resolve Req) :
CSS → TTP TTP → CSP
12 ResCSP (CSS) =
(L,CSP,H(N), ψCSP ,Resolve Req) :
CSP → CSS
initialization has taken place, for the CSS to use resources at CSP, he needs to
submit his item ICSS first, i.e., some form of “deposit”. However, as mentioned
earlier, the process is biased against the CSS. So, rather than sending ICSS to
CSP, he sends it to the TTP. Then, at some time before TE , CSS will query
the CSP to pull the sensor values so that it can decide whether the SLA has
been satisfied. If the SLA is satisfied, then CSS informs TTP that SLA has
been agreed and TTP releases the “payment” to CSP.
SLA-E, FE at CSS and CSP: Specifically, the SLA-E component at the
CSS sends a signed “payment” to its fair exchange component (see Table 5.4,
step 4). This is the item that the FE of CSS will exchange in return for the
satisfactory sensor readings from CSP. The SLA-E at CSS passes the following
to its FE component: (i) the label L, to reference the SLA, (ii) the participant
to send the item to, in this case the TTP and (iii) a signed item. The FE
component then sends this to the TTP (Table 5.5, step 6).
At some time before TE expires, the SLA-E at CSP sends the signed sensor
values (as agreed in the SLA) to its FE component, together with the id of
the intended recipient (in this case, CSS - see Table 5.4, step 4). The FE
component adds the relevant information, such as the label L and the nonce N
to identify the current round and intended SLA (see Table 5.5, step 6). This is
then relayed to the FE component of the CSS, which performs a first check on
the validity of the sensors, i.e., whether the relevant set has been sent. If it
is, the FE component forwards the signed sensor values φCSP , together with
the label L, to the SLA-E component at the CSS (Table 5.4, step 4), who
will be responsible for evaluating the sensor values and determine if there has
been SLA violation. An important factor to note here is that, in case of SLA
violation, a dispute resolution, if there is to be any, may take up to ∆ time
units to resolve. So, the CSP needs to transmit its sensor values to CSS before
TE −∆.
When the SLA has been satisfied, the SLA-E component at the CSS
notifies its FE component of this by sending an ack (Table 5.4, step 5). The FE
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component then notifies the TTP of this (Table 5.5, step 7) by also attaching a
hashed copy of the sensor values. Following this success, the FE component at
the CSP will receive an ack message from the TTP with the signed “payment”
from the CSS attached (Table 5.5, step 7). This payment is then forwarded
to the SLA-E component (Table 5.4, step 4), which then responds with an
ack (Table 5.4, step 5); the FE component of CSP, in turn, responds to its
counterpart in CSS with an ack (Table 5.5, step 8). SLA-E of CSS receives
this ack in Step 5 of Table 5.4.
FE at TTP: During a successful exchange, the FE component of the TTP is
involved in the following situations: (i) it receives the signed “payment” from
the CSS (Table 5.5, step 6), (ii) it receives an acknowledgement from the CSS
to proceed to pay the CSP for successful execution (Table 5.5, step 7), and
(iii) for making the payment to the CSP on behalf of CSS (Table 5.5, step 7).
SLA Violation and Dispute Resolution
Whenever there has been an SLA violation, the notification from the CSS
differs from that when there is a success.
SLA-E, FE at CSS and CSP: When there is a violation, the SLA-E compon-
ent at the CSS sends a copy of the original SLA contract to its FE component
(Table 5.6, step 9). This is then forwarded to the CSP, via the TTP (in step 11
of Table 5.7); FE of CSP forwards the Resolve Req of CSS to SLA-E of CSP
in step 10 of Table 5.6. The SLA-E component at the CSP then acknowledges
this violation by sending a message (Table 5.6, step 10) to its FE component,
which then acknowledges the CSS about this (Table 5.6, step 12).
FE at TTP: The TTP is involved in two ways during an SLA violation and
dispute resolution: (i) It receives a message from the CSS informing it about a
SLA violation, (ii) it verifies the validity of the CSS’s complaint and, if valid, it
notifies the CSP by sending a copy of the contract, rather than the “payment”.
5.1.5 Correctness
Here, I prove the correctness of the SLA enforcement protocol. There are three
properties to the SLA enforcement problem: (i) fairness, (ii) termination and
(iii) non-repudiation.
Fairness:
There are two parts to this proof: (i) when the protocol terminates without a
dispute resolution and (ii) when there is dispute resolution.
No dispute Resolution: When the exchange protocol starts, since the SLA-
E component of each participant P ∈ {CSS,CSP} transmits a signed item
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IP to its respective FE component, and since fair exchange satisfies fairness,
fairness at the SLA-E level is guaranteed.
Dispute Resolution: A dispute resolution is triggered only if ¬VCSP (ICSP ) at
the CSS. Then, from the protocol, SLA-E at the CSS informs its FE component
about the violation by sending a copy of the signed contract (Table 5.6, step 9).
When TTP receives this notification from the CSS, it does not forward ICSS to
CSP , rather it sends ψCSP , with information about a dispute resolution. Since
we assume a loss-averse participant, the CSP knows that there has indeed been
a SLA violation.
Termination:
Successful or Normal exchange involves 4 communication steps: CSS receiving
sensor readings ICSP from CSP, CSS sending ack to TTP, TTP in turn passing
ICSS and ack to CSP, and CSS receiving an ack from CSP. If we ignore
time taken for local computations and assume the bound on (synchronous)
communication delays to be D, the normal exchange can terminate in 4D time
after CSP has initiated its transmission of ICSP . Note that CSP can resume
its cycle c+ 1 services to the CSS while executing the last communication step
in parallel.
Dispute resolution also completes in 4D time after CSP has initiated its
transmission of ICSP : after receiving ICSP , CSS sends its Resolve Req to TTP,
TTP then resolves the request and informs CSP, and finally CSP informs CSS
of an ’adjusted payment’ for cycle c+ 1 services for SLA violations in cycle c.
Thus, ∆ = 4D.
The CSS, after dispute resolution, can initiate a new fair-exchange execution
with adjusted payment. This will involve only 3 communication steps for CSP
to resume its cycle c + 1 services: CSS transferring the adjusted payment
(in Step 6 of Table 5.5) to TTP, sending its ack again to TTP (in Step 7
of Table 5.5) and TTP forwarding the payment and ack to CSP (in Step 7
of Table 5.5). Assuming that execution times are negligible compared to D,
the first two steps will complete within D time; so, CSP should initiate its
transmission of ICSP for cycle c no later than TE − 6D so that the payment
from CSS, even after any SLA violations, reaches CSP no later than TE .
Non-repudiation:
Non-repudiation captures the fact that the CSP or CSS cannot dissociate
themselves from some commitment. For example, the CSP cannot claim that
the sensor values do not originate from it. Here, we need to show that the CSP
can ascertain that the sensor values ICSP originate from the CSP. In Table 5.4,
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step 4, the SLA-E signs ICSS , which is then sent to the FE component at
the CSP. Since FE satisfies non-repudiation (see Chapter 3) and the FE at
each participant (CSS and CSP) forwards the signed item obtained to their
respective SLA-E component (Table 5.4, step 4), then SLA-E can guarantee
non-repudiation.
We have proved that the SLA-E protocol, using the FE component, satisfies
the SLA specification.
5.2 Protocol Implementation
Within distributed computing realm, the term protocol is described when
communicating among system processes using a set of rules and formats to
perform certain tasks. On top of other key formation elements of a protocol,
both the sequence of exchange messages, the data format along their agreed
specifications [52] play a pivotal role to form a protocol. Whereas, a commu-
nication protocol is ”an established set of conventions by which two computers
or communication devices validate the format and contents of the messages
exchanged” OR ”a method by which two computers coordinate their commu-
nications” [158]. In this section, we will be examining our proposed protocol
in a more detailed fashion. We will discover our FEP fair exchange protocol
based solution‘sarchitecture, scope, limitations, properties, mechanism and flow
controls paradigms. We will also elaborate on the test environment, how various
dotes can be connected to implement the design, components, and various
challenges at different computing environments.
In its general construction, there have been some software, network, and
traffic simulating modules were deployed to check how our protocol interacts
to achieve an automated SLA enforcement within the cloud environment. This
implementation also demonstrates how various processes and procedures are
binds systematically to govern three core phases such as message exchange,
message abort and eventually the transaction’s dispute resolution [160].
This paper was primarily intended to transform our previously proposed
conceptual model [160] to an implemented prototype, with a concise yet
technically rich description of each component and its associated operating
elements. The conceptualization of our idea was nothing else but a high-level
depiction of how the protocol’s operation is organized and its expected system’s
behaviour. However, when it comes to the actual implementation, it is usually
comprised of the protocol’s physical, logical, and service regimes to serve
multiple participants e.g. in our case, the CSP, the CSS, and TTP.
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Physical Regimes
Virtualization has transformed the computing service industry. Resource
provisioning, deployment, maintenance, on-demand serviceability, and cost
factors are all undoubtedly convincing. In the cloud computing perspective,
physical computing entities refer to those virtualized computing resources which
are provisioned to a service subscriber e.g. IaaS. Hardware which could include
storage, networking, compute, load balancing, security-related technologies is
either made virtualized or they could be offered as is so the cloud customers
can gain direct access to the CSS data centers, by opting for a premium IaaS
service.
Logical Regimes
In the client/ server architecture, a logical regime covers various processes,
customized applications, and bespoke software to perform certain tasks for
business reasons. These obligations could cover manipulating the data in
various aspects such as to send/receive, process, compute, store or even redirect
incoming service requests from a single or multiple clients to the designated
serving nodes within distributed system environments e.g. cloud computing.
Such logically designed platforms are capable to incorporates expected
interactions among different data/ security controllers and business processes
to perform concurrent tasks. Data access, data exchange, batch processing,
establishing intercommunication, network integration, or even termination of
an entire service are some of the examples. These technologies also facilitate
storing granular information for cross-references to another appliance or service
module.
Services Regimes
The service scope defines such service‘s boundaries where business participants
would agree to certain service obligations so RoI can be well justified. Out-
sourced cloud computing services at either CSS or CSP’s end ascertain op-
erational controls, service dimensions, optics, deployments inclusions and
exclusions taxonomy, service monitoring, service reporting [129]. It also states
a fault‘s definition, ownership, fault-tolerance, rectification, and in the worst-
case scenario service termination. Services scope would also equally dictates
financial terms, conflict of interests, service duration, contractual renewals,
dispute resolutions, and escalation procedures.
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Participants
Figure 2 briefly shows how our four business participants are inter-connected
to serve and deliver cloud-based services. This different architectural view
enhances the knowledge to comprehend participant’s computing estates in terms
of operating scope. It also enlightens how some core modules are provisioned
such as a simulated end users estate using Apache JMeter. The FEP controller
integrated within CSP, CSS and the TTP. Master SLA repository is also
provisioned for cross-referencing to these participants except the end-users as
they don’t need this module. SLA-E module would only be integrated into the
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Figure 5.2: Architecture’s Operational Interaction - Preview
5.2.1 Protocol Mechanisms
This section sheds light on how our protocol’s elementary functionalities are
woven together. Before the protocol initializes prime components e.g. message
exchange, all those mandatory operating conditions (e.g. SLOs, dispute resolu-
tion, service termination, etc.) should be determined and satisfied along with
their essential properties as mentioned in Chapter 3. Various service elements
like how the protocol‘s sequence to be monitored? How message exchange
is determined, when transaction participants for instance CSP, CSS & TTP
would exchange digital services against agreed financial obligations. Defining
how anomaly detection procedures are set in place, is another significant phe-
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nomenon? The protocol‘s flow and error control are indeed paramount in a way
to avoid unnecessary service overheads such as latency, performance, auditing
which eventually could cause temperamental and intermittent SLA violations.
Protocol’s Sequence Control
Protocol sequence control is significantly important. This is linked to the
messaging order how messages (to/from) are being sent and received followed
by a proven logical sequence. This arrangement works through an algorithm
that generates a unique message identification number (UMIN) reference, with
none or least probability of producing an identical UMIN which could cause
chaos while exchanging messages or serving requests to/from clients. These
arrangements also incorporate a distinctive message exchange signature for a
digital forensics tractability in terms of authenticity, correctness, completeness.
The UMIN processes are often agreed upon among service providers and service
subscribers to identify the message‘s authentication, reconciliation transaction
completeness and auditability (missing/ disputed transactions) for tagging each
message for bookkeeping purposes.
This exercise is also beneficial to set message classification in terms of
their prioritization, agreed by one or perhaps all participants. In our test
implementation, where we are simulating users estate as (U), messages are
systematically generated by Apache JMeter, which facilitates the definition of
a UMIN e.g. thread reference number or an e-Tag is wrapped around every
single message is exchanged back and forth. MF which records (Request In
(RI) and Request Out(RO) after time-stamping each message. It eventually
forwards each message to the web service hosting facility. Similarly, it receives
the response from the web service hosted by the CSP and repeats the same
process be recording the RI and RO, before it sends the message response to
the originating entity U. This entire sequence data can be preserved for further
investigation to understand the data provenance when it was communicated
among different entities if and only if a dispute resolution scenario arises.
Protocol‘s Flow Control
This feature administers the chocking off state when an enormous amount
of data is swamped through from one computing entity (The Client) to an-
other (The Server) causes extreme service bottlenecks. The responding node,
therefore, has to put some kind of flow controls in place to avoid such a state
when their request handling and processing capabilities get stranded. This is
mainly achieved by critically monitoring and measuring the incoming/ outgoing
traffic, outsourcing the number of process/ query / compute handlers, and
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determining dedicated resources before getting into a denial of service state.
Flow control sensors mainly capture traffic information such as what layer 4
protocol is being used, source IP , source port , destination IP, destination
port, these values are also known as 5-tuple [3]. Flow control is also managed
through message transmission-blocking and non-blocking conditions, depending
upon the resource provisioning, business expectations, and service deployment
orientation. Following are some of the states, which further explains message
flow control:-
• Time Oriented Flow Control : This control refers to a dedicated time
frame agreed between the CSP and the CSS. For instance, SLAs do yield
what kind of computing tasks can be performed either in a peak time
or off-peak time. These time bared services are designated to arrange
smooth traffic flows to and from the CSP data centers. Subscribers are
encouraged to stick within these allocated time frames so to minimize
unfair service allocation and resource availability to other subscribers.
Most of the time CSP’s are also privileged to either reset, release or even
terminate service connection at any stage, if their flow control monitoring
sensors report some abnormalities. Flow control is also conditional upon
what financial commitments are being made between the CSP and the
CSS. Provisioning a cloud service with regards to SLA is also measured
using the time orientation e.g. AWS Amazon.
• Performance Oriented Flow Control : Service performance is one of
the key element of a cloud service. It counts multiple factors, when
evaluating a service performance e.g. bandwidth, response time, latency
and availability are some of the major service elements when it comes to
the service performance.
• Security Oriented Flow Control : This element of protocol flow control is
responsible to ensure security mechanism. Traffic flow is critically audited
from service security perspective. Message exchange is conditional to
traffic pattern and behavior. Traffic data is periodically reviewed using
signatures repository to understand how traffic flow is passing through the
data centers. For instance Amazon AWS like other cloud service providers
offers a monitoring feature where traffic flow logs of a virtual private cloud
VPC can be captured and monitored. This feature monitors any unusual
traffic flows occurred, due to a service faults, security compromise or a
perhaps a service downgrade via (request for configuration change).
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Protocol’s Error Control
In digital communication, a protocol‘s error detection Intrinsically depends
upon other functionalities related to the message‘s integrity. It determines a
seamless message exchange between two parties constituting if, sender‘s and
receiver‘s authenticity, validation, verification elements, are reliable on unreli-
able networks for instance internet. Therefore, error handling is anticipated
on higher priorities as it could modify a service state from success to failure.
These errors ranging from failed tasks, communication, or processing time-outs
or modified system-level permissions, could distort part or even the entire
service delivery hence violating the SLA. Various schemes such as Checksums,
Parity Checks, Cyclic Redundancy Check CRC -enabled appliances and devices
can instantly analyze messages for an unexpected error, integrity, accidental or
maliciously injected faults, or any other similar abnormality. A communication
protocol in a distributed systems realm depends upon a multiple-layered error
handling mechanism. The first message fails within the end user‘s environment
and never leaves their network. The second message leaves the end-user estate
but never arrives at the CSP estate. Finally, a state when CSP processes
the requests but those requests for soem reason stay within CSP‘s network
eventually hence arrives the end user‘s estate.
Let‘s briefly explore the AWS error handling techniques. They have mainly
divided the errors into two categories. First is classed as Client‘s errors
(error codes 4**), where AWS APIs doesn‘t accept the client‘s request due to
some obvious reasons. This could refere to either authentication, verification
or validation of either the credentials, parameters or agreed configurations.
Second category is of those errors, which are associated to the AWS‘s service
environment such as their networks, compute or storage related (error codes
5**), where these serving nodes either do not process the client‘s request(s)
or if they do, the number of retries or request re-submissions to resolve, is
too long. This unnecessary time to process those requests consequently times
out, which causes violating the SLAs. Predominantly, a forensics analysis
should be able to discover the failure causality, especially if occurs within their
environment so to decide if service credits will be rewarded to the clients by
the CSP, in case of a disputed service delivery. For instance cloud service like
AWS Amazon, the AmazonClientExceptions and AmazonServiceExceptions,
both hold potential information that where the service failure occurred [13].
5.2.2 The Architecture Scope
Architecture‘s scope covers fundamental service and operational obligations.
Here author tries to illuminate some of operative expectations along with those
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situational states when our protocol would behave incorrectly. As already
mentioned we don‘t have to go through the individual component‘s working
however some of their scope elements needs to be explained here. Participants
must agree upon the protocol deployment‘s conditions including perimeter-
configurations at both C○ & application level settings at U○ are met. The
protocol‘s proof of concept will run to demonstrate it‘s authoritative and oper-
ational capabilities such as monitoring, aborting, halting or even a temporary
termination (in case of an unfair and an unsolicited service delivery) transac-
tions. Dispute resolution, the prime objective, will be triggered, when a dispute
is marked as unresolved between the CSP and the CSS. Each participant knows
their corresponding trust boundaries, service role and how the FEP module‘d
integration will be collaborated.
Any sub-components at any participant‘s environment, which directly or
indirectly, effects SLA enforcement or constraints service monitoring, till the
end of the agreed term, would be considered as an auxiliary-module of this
architecture. Assumptions will also be taken into the account e.g. sub-protocols,
processes, procedures, systems configurations and segregated service monitoring
controls are all successfully implemented by all the participants and the master
configuration SLA metrics are duly recorded into the FEP master node at
TTP. This is how FEP module, will be able to enforce an automated, flawless
and trustworthy dispute resolution after verification, validation and persuasive
collaboration with SLA-E modules at C○ and S○. Retaining security logs,
events and capturing SLA metrics (such as response time, bandwidth, latency,
etc.) within their own environments, will also be considered as protocol‘s core
functionality.
Reviewing figure 5.2, where although all participants (C.U.T.S) are inde-
pendent computing entities, yet, they are somehow bound through mutually
agreed FEP component, which synchronously evaluates SLA compliant message
exchanges. Often CSPs do define some shared responsibilities for running,
securing and operating their provisioned services. In SaaS, additional adversar-
ies, related to the data at transit, (insider/ outsider cyber attacks, malicious
participants, intentional/ accidental service compromises, service degrading,
etc.), between the end users estate and the service provider‘s trust boundaries,
are out of the scope of this paper. These global topologies such as internet,
involve abundant 3rd parties, acting as transitional hosting services (mid-tier
service carriers) while transporting the data, could cause a serious service
disruptions, such compromises do occur, however, those adversaries will be
omitted at this stage.
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JM‘s Scope
As this paper demonstrates a prototype, therefore, we chose to simulate the
end user‘s estate using Apache‘s JMeter. The test plan is configured to depict
a very basic HTTP traffic, which is directed to an assigned IP and port
of a remotely based MF. JMeter‘s test plan configuration can be changed
accordingly to show certain variance of users activities. For the sake of our this
implementation, the basic requirement was to generate users inputs, who are
trying to access a cloud service by just visiting the cite. JMeter‘s mandate is to
either send or receive these messages to and from the intended final recipient
(e.g. cloud service) via MF. JMeter‘s other obligations at it‘s application layer
could be, to record other key metadata. JMeter would record HTTP‘s various
response codes [34], depending the service negotiations, up time, availability
and successful provisioning. It keep dispatching the messages to it‘s recipient
until either client‘s given time slot is exhausted or one of service termination
signal is generated locally for various reasons.
MF‘s Scope
The MF is only obliged to receive incoming messages, timestamps them and
redirects those messages to the actual cloud service, where it‘s being hosted.
That cloud service process the query, resend them to the MF. These responses
are received by the MF, which again timestamps them and send them back
to the end users. MF also calculates the response time and records the entire
transmission, which periodically sent by the CSP to the CSS so the SLA
compliant transactions can be marked before paying the upfront to the cloud
service for the next term services.
We also require a message forwarder (MF) which forwards the signals to
predefined destination node(s). FEP module as we learnt is the central brain
which makes the QoS assessment with the notion of SLA enforcement. This
module is deployed at CSP, CSS and the TTP’s end in a fashion where these
modules are inter-linked and can establish the communication among these
participants when a violation occurs or a dispute query arises.
FEP‘s Scope
FEP module is the central brain which makes QoS assessments with the
notion of SLA enforcement. It analyze every single message against SLA‘s
master configuration repository, while CSP‘s response transmissions are being
exchanged. Those stats mainly holds message date, time, transaction id and
the response time. On behlaf of CSP and CSS, MF runs an evaluation scheme
which produces the ART. Based on these ART, the FEP sends the alert to the
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TTP. Actions like Exchange, Abort, Resume and Terminate a communication
channel also falls within FEP‘s scope.
SLA(E)‘s Scope
SLA(E) not only collaborates the FEP to reconcile the SLA but it also refreshes
the latest version of an updated SLA between CSP and the CSS whenever a
new service negotiation takes place. It holds copy of the master configuration
file (stating the SLA metrics e.g. the agreed response time), duly approved and
acknowledged by the TTP.
5.2.3 The Protocol Limitation
While designing & implementing a protocol, certain limitations and operating
constraints cannot be ignored. These weakening elements could easily impact a
service delivery in a distributed SOA architecture. Therefore, to pin point the
failure, one has to understand all the service dimensions at both, the client‘s
end and the provider‘s end. A slight variation of either computing resource
allocation, changes in system configuration, adding unnecessary restriction
to the system access and other putting additional security overheads, could
cause a serious problem to a running system process by either terminating &
disrupting or even producing falsify signals. Following is the list of the which
can be considered as the most critical of those constraints, which could leave
the impact behind:
• Assets Accessibility
• Metadata (e.g. web service metrics) file format
• Data Interporatability
• Timely Negotiations (SLA & SLOs)
• Conflicting Interfaceability
• Unpredictable Faults at Operational Boundaries
• Legal & Regulatory Constraints
• Monetary Limitations
• Clock Synchronization
• Unidentified Attackers & service compromises
• Involvement of another 3rd party/ service contractor
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As a matter of fact, most of the cloud service providers are a bit stringy
when it comes to monitor and collect metadata of provisioned services. Appar-
ently, they do offer very restricted security surveillance of their web services
as they do use various throttling techniques to minimize resource sharing.
Amazon‘s CloudWatch and other 3rd party tools collaboration is out there,
however, monitoring restrictions, such as what is being monitored? How
much is being monitored? What is being collected and how much is being
collected. Some of SaaS solutions, do allow to integrate their APIs with tools
for specifically monitoring Application Performance Management APM like
AppNeta, Dynatrace, and DataDog however to acquire them is far too risky for
service subscribers to associate these 3rd parties. These entities can certainly
monitor and collect, client‘s data and even these vendors cannot guarantee that
subscriber‘s business requirements will be met or not to monitor a particular
service element. Therefore, a service subscriber could end up provisioning
too many different tools to meet business requirements on top of the CSP‘s
additional charges to monitor and collect these metrics too. Our protocol
does face some of these limitations at certain computing stages as some of the
service elements are composed and managed by the 3rd parties when messages
are being sent or received. Refine tuning of various service performance, scalab-
ility, and reliability considerations are reviewed and implemented to ensure a
successful communication is established with a minimal failure probability.
Architecture‘s On-premise Virtualized Deployment-SN1 Architec-
ture testing on a single machine would ultimately exhaust system resources,
especially when multiple resource-hungry tasks such as a continuous stream of
message exchange, are being processed. Single CPU would only handle certain
instructions per process whereas project execution requires a platform with
appropriate compute resources and a higher level of service resilience within
a distributed environment such as virtualization. The following figure shows
how we intend to test our FEP based architecture in different environments.
Virtualization is the prime software technology that serves the global cloud
computing environments. Implementing these miraculous frameworks em-
powers the existing limited computing resources so they can be transformed
into multi-shared computing infrastructures for various business purposes and
service provisions. An abstraction layer sits between the application and the
underlying computer hardware, which adds more flexibility, reliability, security
by diminishing the redundancy and economic factors at the same time. For
getting advantage of these embedded features, we commissioned few virtual
machines.
We placed all our prime transaction participants on dedicated virtual
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machines and established their interaction through setting up endpoint com-
munication channels and system permissions and corresponding configurations.
This arrangement facilitates JM, which will be sending simulated messages
to another virtual machine, representing an MF, which redirects the network
traffic to a preconfigured endpoint, the webserver. This web server acts as the
CSP‘s node, where we have configured an application server so to respond to
the original client’s request and vise versa. We configure MF on each node
except TTP. The MF module on CSS primarily performed a critical task by
evaluating the required SLA metric ART. Time stamping and recording each
HTTP request simulated by going through JM back and forth through MF
updates a metadata repository. As previously agreed, the designated CSS
node would send SLA metrics as a (.csv file format), periodically to the CSP
for reconciliation and forensics purposes. These periodic transmissions would
establish the fact whenever the SLA gets violated so the affected participant can
be compensated through the fair exchange protocol. QoS also gets evaluated
so if the said service is found SLA compliant then only the next service term
will be agreed upon by paying the upfront fees, otherwise, the service will be
terminated.
While running this experience which consists of few dedicated on-premise
virtual machines, the expected ART indicates a latency due to the system
resources do get overstretched and eventually it shows anomalous alerts of
ART, when calculated. Through this exercise, we also noticed that we do get an
unusual and unstable response time, which was probably because of overloading
the system processes and delays. Concurrent resource utilization gradually
reduces the CPU and memory allocation and provisioning for upcoming and
awaiting threads sent by JM. Although the number of simulated users we set
on our JM test plan was as per the recommendations by Apache‘s guidance
and other best practices advice, however, the local machine‘s resource handling
causes a bottleneck for the VMs which is hosting the sample web application
to responds to messages effectively and efficiently.
Architecture‘s Cloud Deployment-SN2 The commercial emergence of
cloud computing has been a phenomenal revolution and great motivation to
the business world. The migration of corporate information assets such as
infrastructure, development platforms DevOps and web based services, holds
amazing attractions for enterprises of all sizes, however, it introduces some
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Figure 5.3: Architecture’s Cloud Deployment on Azure
The following Fig 5.4 illustrates the architecture in terms of defined pro-
cesses on each node. Technical processes that the protocol may carry out,
depending upon the what phase and what state the participants are in, at
that specific point. This further refers to various stages like Exchange, Abort,
Resolve stages. During the service setup/ initialization phase, most of the
operating terms are negotiated so to ensure timely process execution and
expected interaction at each node. This concept where these four protocol
stakeholders, carry out their message exchange whereas TTP being the service
monitor and who sits in line evaluates these activities between CSS and CSP.
Any anomalous behaviour is triggered via pre-defined processes such as FE and
SLA(E) as described in the above interactions gets artifacts verification against
the master SLA, stored at TTP’s SLA repository which might be holding other
SLAs for other clients. The entire service and process execution are bounded
via full-time synchronization. FEP server is mainly residual at TTP which
keeps interacting that how the service exchange processes are being evolved
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throughout the service cycle till the end of normal or a reported abnormal
termination, which rigorously performs the reconciliation against the master
SLA, dispatched and acknowledged by both the CSP and the CSS. Thus these
interconnected and fully synchronized processes ensure an end to end fairness.
Figure 5.4: Process Execution
Generally, there are three main classifications of these challenges such as
technical, operational, security [5, 82]. The scope of these challenges includes
resource interoperability, granularity, service orientation, commercial factors,
security, performance, QoS. All these factors are bundled in a mutually signed
service level agreement for it‘s corresponding service or set of services, we have
carried out some discussion about cloud computing(CC) & SLA Implications
[74] and their associated key service elements and attributes. The scope of our
testing is to demonstrate how do we achieve SLA enforcement by employing
fair exchange protocol at the final phase of our test-bed.
Among multiple cloud service providers e.g. Microsoft Azure, AWS Amazon,
and Google, we chose Microsoft Azure as our prime test-bed because of its
popularity, flexibility, economical factor, and the number of other features
offered by the service provider [6, 115]. Azure compute instance or a virtual
machine, is an elastic compute segment. These resources are featured with
instant cloud provisioning, where their subscribers do get full freedom to select
various customer’s centric cloud services and Cloud Application Programming
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Interfaces CAPIs. This includes lower-level cloud infrastructure deployments
to a full enterprise-level application and other strategic automation solutions.
Unlike an on-premise computing deployment, most CSPs do offer minimal
configuration, maximized scalability, rapid set-up time, secure and robust
failure resilience platforms.
To mimic a real-world cloud service scenario, we assume that the CSS A
provisions some web service to their client estate(D), which was originally
leased from the CSP (B), against some financial commitments by setting an
SLA. As previously learned that the SLA shows the entire service delivery plan
such as deployment, SLOs, QoS, list of expected services, and the compensation
workouts, in case if the CSP fails to deliver those promised SLOs within an
agreed amount of time or an agreed scale of resource availability.
Our foremast focus is on ensuring the precision of our results especially
when our protocol’s administrative handlers such as an Exchange, Abort and
Resolve gets triggered, acknowledged, and reported to and from the designated
participants. Therefore, we tested our protocol on numerous cloud deployment
schemes, tools, techniques, and procedures. It surely helps to refine our parti-
cipating back-end operating nodes like JMeter, MF, and other monitoring and
response sensors. This would also better align and evaluate our architecture’s
system configuration, inter-communication schemes, security composition, and
fault tolerance to mimics a real-time SLA-based cloud service delivery with
the least performance issues and other potential technical bottlenecks so a
mutually trusted autonomous SLA enforcement can be fictionalized.
CSS Environment
To depict our participant’s estate, we require to create four virtual instances
for representing CSS, CSP, TTP, and the client environment. Although this
was previously tested on Amazon AWS and other cloud resources, however,
the last testing was performed on the Microsoft Azure Cloud environment.
Explaining our architecture deployment, let‘s refer our readers to the Section
5.2 so defining our infrastructure instances with their corresponding logical
and service orientations, capabilities, and functionalities. For the CSS node, as
Azure offers a variety of OS‘s e.g. (Windows or Linux based) images, we opted
an instance series which is a canonical, Ubuntu 18.04LTS VM with 2vcpus,
8GiB memory, and 30GiB standard SSD. In terms of CPU, memory, and
disk input/output operations per second (IOPS) utilization, our experiment‘s
initial requirement, and estimated usage were not projected as huge, therefore,
provisioning some premium resources, was unnecessary at the moment. An
Azure VM instance offers the users the flexibility to deploy multiple instances,
start, stop, restart or even terminate them whenever requires. Because the CSS
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instance represents a central hosting server, where some strategic programs
and monitoring sensors have configured, therefore, it will be useful if these
segments can be first discussed.
First, discussing our Java-based MF application, which resides here. It
does not only proxies the message stream between the CSP and the Client
estate but it also records key metrics average response time, in our case. It
also timestamps every single (in/out)message, which could later be used for
reconciliation purposes, if and when needed. A successful service exchange is
the prime administrative control of this protocol, of which bases the SLA will
be enforced. In a synchronous system, the messages are sent in a methodical
sequential arrangement when a client is either seeking a server response over
HTTP/ HTTPS. This message exchange is usually organized either in a syn-
chronous blocking or an asynchronous model non-blocking. End users at the
client‘s entity D would seek some of the server‘s responses for example one of
the HTTP status code either 2xx Success,3xx Redirection, 4xx Client or 5xx
Server from the intended web service, provisioned by the CSP. We assume that
at the beginning when the CSP service is delivered as a proof of concept, the
client tests their accessibility and gets the HTTP status code 200 for an OK
or pingable service. Depending upon the number of users at the client-side,
a message which is holding some metadata about an HTTP/HTTPS request
would probably include some requests from client to server and consequently
some responses from the hosting server to the intended client. The same MF
agent also holds the metrics which are bundled into a .csv file format and stores
them into the Azure Storage Blob future experiment to gain and test more
agility and resilience while testing our architecture.
Our future work will be carried out based upon an asynchronous commu-
nication model but for now, because the scope of this work is woven around
synchronous communication, we are not using any of the robust message
queueing systems designed and well approved for message queuing based upon
asynchronous such as RabbitMQ, ActiveMQ. We will be using Pika which works
best for both the asynchronous and synchronous models.
To create this environment, Microsoft Azure is the best option as they offer
a huge service catalog to chose multiple elastic services among other vendors.
They facilitate for instant provisioning of multi-purposed cloud-based systems
hosting to serve as a compute, store, network, and other business-critical
services with less hassle. To depict our participant’s estate, we require to
create four virtual instances for representing CSS, CSP, TTP, and the client
environment. Explaining our architecture deployment, let‘s refer our readers
to Fig. 5.3, where we categorized our three-fold deployment consisting of
71
the infrastructure estate, depicts the physical virtual machine(s) pointing our
architecture‘s various participants. Then it comes to the logical deployment
scheme shows how do they inter-communicate and finally how the service fabric
is knitted around it all.
For shortlisting our cloud experiment (virtual)infrastructure, we chose an
Azure compute instance or a hosting model where we can have a full end-to-end
administrative control of participating nodes within our testing environment.
These services could be containerized using Azure compute service catalogue
such as Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) or application service aka App Ser-
vice, however, we, at this stage, chose to run independent virtual machines
for each participant. For the CSS node, Azure offers a variety of OS‘s e.g.
(Windows or Linux based) images, we opted for an instance series which is
a canonical, Ubuntu 18.04LTS VM with 2vcpus, 8GiB memory, and 30GiB
standard SSD. In terms of CPU, memory, and disk input/output operations
per second (IOPS) utilization, our experiment‘s initial requirement, and estim-
ated usage were not projected as huge, therefore, provisioning some premium
resources, was unnecessary at the moment. Because an Azure VM instance in
fact is a virtual machine so it offers the users the flexibility to deploy multiple
instances, start, stop, restart or even terminate them whenever it requires.
Another fact is that for our test implementation we opted the free-tier version
of Azure instance, which put a lot of usability and maintenance restrictions.
The vendor offers a certain number of hours per instance per month to run
as free with no or very minimal support however for heavily usage the enter-
prise versions are available with better features and higher resources specs e.g
24x7 support, back-up, monitoring, and other corporate maintenance privileges.
An additional component such as configuring a virtual network, network
interface(NIC) settings and network security group (NSG) to define allowed
or denied state for our network traffic is implemented with accordance to our
requirements followed by the service provider‘s guidance and best practice.
Secure remote logins to these nodes, protocols like SSH (Secure Shell) or
RDP (Remote Desktop) are used once obtaining RSA public-private key pair
along with the corresponding IP address of the intended node. Access keys can
be downloaded to access the instance remotely using above mentioned remote
access protocols. The VM instance is also associated with public and private
IP addresses for connectivity and identification purposes.
The reason we prefer Ubuntu on Microsoft‘s Azure environment was due to
its popularity, agility, scalability, and seamlessness. No wonder, due to these
features most of the development environments and innovation platforms do
prefer to run Linux on Azure or other similar cloud computing estates. That‘s
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why this central server, is built using an Ubuntu server image for its suitability
and compatibility with our protocol implementation on this prototype. Being
the CSS central node, this controller node is capable of hosting most of our
workload processing and monitoring the cloud services been provisioned to
CSS‘s multiple client estates, however, for this experiment our scope would be
to monitor a single client and their provisioned cloud services in terms of how
CSP delivers the QoS against the SLA and how our suggested architecture
diligently and methodically enforces it.
This is the instance where our Java-based module MF is also being placed.
This would eliminate any unnecessary delays and other network tribulation
and minimize the deployment overheads. MF receives the traffic coming from
the user‘s estate and forwards it to the cloud services. It is also capable of
returning the signals to its initialing node within the user’s estate.
Application Deployment To build our application estate, AEB works
miraculously to deploy scalable web applications and other similar cloud-
based services. Because of its diversified deployment platform, enterprise-level
applications developed using java, python, go, etc. can be deployed using wide-
ranging application server environments such as Apache, IIS, Glassfish, etc. in
a pretty straightforward manner. The AEB automatically handles all kinds
of challenges from capacity provisioning to load balancing and multi-featured
health monitoring along with rapid alerts distribution to multiple recipient
platforms e.g. email, SMS, etc. Application deployments are also equipped
with auto-scaling triggers to match the resources utilization to meet business
and financial limitations [14].
CSS Environment
The CSS environment (S) holds the FEP module and a copy of SLA. FEP
module here is not being depicted as the signals from the user’s environment
”U” are directly forwarded to the AWS EC2 instance, the CSS estate, however,
getting the feed from the CSP’s FEP. Furthermore, using this feed, an alert can
be configured which can send generate a signal when the SLA gets violated. For
this purpose, monitoring services like AWS CloudWatch, DataDog, Dynatrace
can be used by adding pre-defined SLA metrics. This monitoring can be
further extended to compare and measure when and how the SLA was breached.
Monitoring solutions can send prioritized alerts e.g. emails or text messages to
the appropriate recipients and mobile devices respectively. These alerts can
perhaps also feed another entity like Security Incidents & Event Management
SIEM appliances like Splunk, ArcSight, or QRadar for further investigation
and distribution. Moreover, for dealing with certain alert services like Zabbix,
RHQ and fluentd are well known for their features to serve the purpose.
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TTP Environment
TTP environment (T) is the entity that administers any disputes or service
ambiguities, which could occur due to many reasons. In our deployment
solution, we assume the TTP is deployed on a cloud instance with a FEP
module. It also holds the copy of the SLA agreed between CSP and the CSS.
Furthermore, it also hosts some other solution for verification and validation
of messages among these entities to avoid any malicious traffic gets injected
or other similar attacks like Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) or Man-in-the-Cloud
(MITC) attack scenarios. To distinguish this entity’s prime existence we suggest
some kind of cluster coordination service that can maintain the integrity of
node’s configuration information. In our suggested implementation such a
service would act as a centralized system that holds the SLA configuration and
other system configurations within a distributed environment, With this goal
in mind, we could deploy Apache’s Zookeeper, doozerd, etcd, consul, chef, or
puppet, to govern and publish the system configuration and other SLO related
information on every single node while a periodic yet synchronized convergence
is transmitted.
End Users Environment
In our implementation plan, the end-user production environment U plays a
vibrant role. This entity uses the cloud services and acts as a full workspace
to gauge the cloud service‘s performance capabilities reflecting the SLA. Here
the user‘s environment can be depicted by an Ubuntu or a Microsoft Windows
computing platform, comprises JMeter [18] which is Apaches‘s load testing
simulation solution. Despite having other comparable solutions like Taurus,
SIEGE, LOIC, and BURP JMeter helps to run multiple pre-configured load
testing plans and analysis patterns. Its low-resource consumption feature, meas-
ures the targeted system performance and its operational behavior illustrating
different communication protocols e.g. HTTP, SOAP, LDAP, POP3/SMTP
and other similar regimes. For the sake of this paper‘s scope, we will be testing
a sample web application on AEB environment.
Due to Jmeter‘s flexibility and other distinct features, it became the first
choice to simulate the user‘s environment. This open-source tool contains
both the GUI and non-GUI initiatives along with its platform-independence
attribute, to both stand-alone and distributed test executions. While running
the implementation, our JMeter test plan holds the entire information about
the targeted server which holds the sample web application packaged under
a .jar file format. Although, there are other multiple choices available on the
table to deploy the subject web application either on a stand-alone application
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server such as Oracle, IBM, VM, Microsoft, Apache or to host it via some
automated application deployment resource such as AEB or a similar SaaS.
Jmeter in returns fetches various metrics like timestamp, elapsed time,
response code, thread name, latency, transaction success, and failure message
when an HTTP request sampler is composed. It produces a comma-separated
value .csv file as explained in RFC4180.
5.2.4 FEP Implementation Requirements
There are certain pre-requisites which are considered mandatory prior to
execute the protocol. These requirements act as individually however their
robust interaction with each other helps to draw precise results how the
automated SLA enforcement and dispute resolution is being carried out and
monitored.
• A valid SLA between CSP & CSS
• A User estate
• A CSP estate
• A CSS estate
• A TTP
• A Message Forwarding Module
• FE & SLA enforcement modules
• A Secure communication environment with pre-defined validation &
verification arrangements among all the entities
Additional requirements such as log analysis and other discovery tools can
be opted depending upon the business requirements however as per the paper
scope, this would be extended for future research work.
Protocol’s SLA Negotiation
Every time a cloud service is provisioned, it is contracted under a valid SLA
between participants such as the service provider and the service subscriber.
Measuring a cloud service is only meant for both, the CSS and the CSP, so to
attain acceptable fairness how the said service being delivered with acceptable
QoS and other associated measuring capabilities & metrics e.g. (from high
level e.g. availability, bandwidth, average transactions per second, latency to
low-level e.g. CPU, memory, etc.). Service scope is clearly defined along with
deployment limitations and a potential service state [62]. Furthermore, for
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QoS monitoring the business time is defined as Mon-Fri, 8:30 am - 6:00 pm
as service peak time whereas the rest of the days and hours including public
holidays are classed as off-peak time e.g. Sat-Sun. While putting these layers,
the cloud service is presumably secure and reliable within predefined confidence
bound, as stated by the service provider.
Table 5.8: SLA Sample Metrics
SLA Metrics Targeted Threshold (peak-time)
Availability = 99.999 %
Average Response Time 5 50 milliseconds
It draws a line between CSS requirements and CSP capabilities when a
service delivery will be classified as ”service failure” or ”SLA violation”.
SLA Definition To put our test in action, we require a sample SLA so to
configure our monitors and other sensors to observe the QoS exceptions while
these entities C.U.T.S interact with each other in both stateful and stateless,
cloud-based SOA architectures. SLA metrics evaluate four principle rules of
a service request such as (when start, where start, when end, where end) at
both the client and the server ends [61]. Out of a long list of various cloud
metrics, we only chose an average response time ART to gauge the SLA. We
understand that the TCP-based traffic is bound under a basic flow control
mechanism and hence other operating factors could seriously impact achieving
the desired SLO’s in a distributed computing system such as cloud computing.
In real-world service provisioning, the elapsed time yields, the request
execution by the requesting client node, till the requested service request is
completed or the given set of tasks are fully processed by the serving node.
This refers to the service performance monitoring so to compare whether the
service is SLA compliant or not. Factors like poor bandwidth, an excessive
number of users, longer processing time, and request complexity could affect
the response time. A longer response time would ultimately pose a greater risk
for SLA violation For our test environment 50 ms (milliseconds) is considered
as the SLA threshold for a typical response time over the internet when one can
expect the completion of a request [105]. ART can be calculated by dividing the
net violations in terms of time outs by the total number of requests generated
by JM multiplied by 100.
ART = total violation / total requests x 100
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Protocol’s Exchange Signal
As mentioned in the conceptual model section 5.2.1, we assume that the SLA
has already been signed between the CSP ”C” and the CSS ”S”. The copy of
the same SLA has already been sent by both these parties to the TTP ”T”. The
reason TTP keeps the copy of this SLA is entirely for future reference and will
be directed it when a dispute situation arises upon SLA violation. Although
the end-users are utilizing the cloud service, an alert is sent periodically by the
C to the S, whose FEP module evaluates the SLA compliance by comparing
the ART. The time when SLA S is transmitted to intended recipients it can
also be packaged with other information such as VCSS (resp. VCSP ) via Jmeter.
Protocol’s Dispute Signal
Upon a successful initialization and setup of the protocol implementation by
sending some test transmissions and their respective acknowledgments by C, S,
and T, the BAU exchange cycle begins. We assume that S has already deposited
its ICSS to the T as a token, which will be released upon a satisfactory SLA
compliant service delivery by C, the service provider. Meanwhile, from these
BAU signal transmissions, we take 15 minutes of samples to depict the real
environment to avoid huge data manipulation. For SLA compliant service
delivery we consider a status-code 200 [203] which represents that a simple
request has been succeeded within a qualifying period regardless of a method
used e.g. GET method of HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) executed via
JMeter by attaining our expected responses within specified SLA time e.g.
50(ms).
Protocol’s Abort Signal
To classify a service failure or SLA violation, should JMeter gets an HTTP
status-code e.g. 4xx bad request, unauthorized, forbidden or not found etc.
or 5xx server errors e.g. service unavailable, gateway time out, etc. it will
be considered as a service interruption due to certain reasons as mentioned
above. FEP module will evaluate when this situation occurs. The TTP is the
entity which will eventually be contacted by S, to report the abort state. To
further refine the scenario we use Jmeter‘s duration assertion which marks both
FALSE or TRUE) responses. Here the one of our depicted trigger sent abort
message, calculating the ART of each failed thread on periodic monitoring
basis to the entity T. This shows an unnecessarily longer responses that is




When and how these entities resolve the dispute: say our FEP and security
modules would send their feed to the TTP, who would have enough evidence
to decide a fair resolution considering the victimized entity using true SLA
metrics & master copy of SLA. This will be performed after reviewing and
evaluating service metrics at the end of the term. The malicious participant
would not be able to defend such a state, hence, the dispute resolution benefit
would be granted to the honest participant.
This is can be reviewed from a couple of iterations how the suggested
protocol would initiate the resolved signal and how it would set the TTP and
the participants to acknowledge it. See row 4 and row 6 of Table 5.1 and &
also see row 11,12 Table 5.7.
Post Reconciliation & Service Restoration
Once the outstanding disputes are set to resolve and the honest participants
acknowledge the receipt of having their due service credits or financial dues fully
paid, the FEP modules along with the SLE(E) would be set to a service term.
Any potential changes to SLA/SLOs will certainly be considered so the SLA
metrics are measured accordingly. Any previous poor QoS stats associating
the causality of any SLA violations would be added to the service monitoring
look-ups to avoid any repetition of the same SLA violations. Protocol sensors
would be adjusted and the relevant information will also be cascaded to the
concerns TAs and the TTP to avoid any false positives which could trigger an
abnormal service termination or unsolicited configuration mismatch at either
CSP or the CSS FEP modules.
5.3 Results
This section reviews results as an out come of our protocol‘s implementation.
We tested about six schemes with different system configurations from local
host on-premise to distributed computing models e.g. AWS Amazon, to depict
real world business scenarios. Behind these optimization techniques, the key
intention was to study how our suggested protocol operates (in terms of service
automation and SLA enforcement) in different computing states. We chose
ART as a sample QoS SLO metric, to gauge various responses while monitoring
QoS factor of our sample web application. Placement of monitoring sensors
has always been a critical task, therefore, our MF was provisioned separately
as out of the end user trust boundary, on a dedicated appliance system. This
would assist to obtain more refined and improved results. Initially, the role of
a MF was only to redirect messages but later an extended mandate was also
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given to act as a metrics monitoring sensor. It collects transaction stats and
eventually pass them as per the agreed schedules. At the end of the monitoring,
it produces a comma-separated values .csv file which is well known to be used
on different platforms. Defining the SLO metric threshold is anther critical
task so to set a realistic response time pointer. Shorter the response time would
be better to to align the service consistency and other elements of QoS. These
readings translate a response patterns from CSP to service endpoint within a
distributed environment. After reviewing various web services response times,
we decided to set the threshold of 50ms for the SLA compliant ART. Each
message exchange would be responded within this time frame or else it would
be classed as an SLA violation if the response time is greater to 50ms. We will
briefly analyse how our captured SLA metrics can be used for the following
four immediate tasks as diversified reconciliation:-
Periodic SLA violationsa) Response Time variationb)
Net Message Exchangesc) TTP‘s Involvementd)
Reviewing Periodic SLA Violations
The first and the prime dimension to analyze the results is to have full robust
visibility of when and how SLA violations occurred. This analysis presents
concentrated results as we gathered from various experimental instances staged
on our cloud-based implementation e.g. Azure. Refer to the Fig 5.3 the
deployment scheme was configured considering an approach, which enabled
us to focus each service node’s benchmarking while message exchange was
being performed. This focuses on our intended SLO metrics average response
time (ART). This deployment was tested on two types of Microsoft Azure
virtual instances, first one was a manually configured application server hosted
on Ubuntu where the other was an on Azure Elastic Web services automated
application deployment platform. To capture these results, in a more refined
manner, the said deployment was variously tested before probe the actual
three days transactions at various times. This approach leads us to properly
validate and verify the testing regime’s real-time stability, accuracy, and precise
capturing of the client/server responses. Another objective was to set the
SLO benchmarking point which depicts a real-world business scenario. At this
stage, one clarification is vital to specify about the placement of the sensor,
where these results were being gathered. The chosen estate was an independent
cloud entity where the MF node was configured, which does multi-tasking e.g.
forwarding to/from messages as well recording their timestamps for auditing
and forensics purposes in case of further escalation of dispute resolutions via
legal holds.
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Table 5.9: CSP‘s Captured SLA Metrics





















These critical business stats will later be shared with the CSS periodically by
the CSP as well the TTP when needed. Table 5.9 shows three columns, where
the first column presents 20 sample transactions the captured SLA-Metrics.
The second column shows the service delivery’s actual ART at calculated at the
end of each transaction and the third column is the agreed and pre-configured
SLA (50ms) threshold to be monitored by each FEP module sits on all three
business participants. Each message exchange between the end-user estate and
the CSP is evaluated against this threshold of 50ms. Monitoring an acceptable
service request SLO metric e.g. response time against the CSP‘s SLA claim
should be carefully tested prior to signing the SLA as urged by [8, 130, 168].
This table enlists about 20 different transactions, which were recorded
within the CSP computing estate. These metrics are probed only for CSS
as, both the service provider and service subscriber are mutually agreed to
share these periodic samples on monthly for ensuring SLA compliance. The
TTP for being an agreed monitoring authority would also get a copy of these
records following a BAU Business As Usual procedure. All these participants
would follow a standard agreed verification and validation process, prior to
commence the message exchange. Our assumption is that the BAU message
exchange would run for a certain period of time (e.g. monthly or a longer
service contract term). The provided sample represents just a fragment out of
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those message streams mutually exchanged by the CSP and the CSS‘s client.
The key determination was to constitute a legal and forensically proven digital
evidence to support and settle any dispute between both the parties, if arises.
These numbers would also ultimately serve the auditing and reconciliation
needs performed by pre-configured and automated FEP modules at their
corresponding nodes. This short metric capture would only be held on a random
basis while the service is being provisioned. An exception will be granted to
those system states when the CSP‘s provisioned services are declared either as
faulty or under an agreed/ pre-scheduled maintenance downtime. For the sake
of our prototype, we merely recorded three days of the entire service month.
Exchanging these metrics every day would not be feasible (cost/resources)
but also be considered as an unnecessary overhead. It would also impact
the service delivery by overstretching available computing infrastructure and
human resources at both ends. Reviewing the Table 5.9, which highlights only
three anomalies [service entries] sla-metric7, sla-metrics9 and sla-metric15,
mentioned in red. As these entries yield the ART is greater than 50ms, so each
of them would be marked as a potential SLA violation for that particular day/
time and transaction cycle. We also have to bear in mind that these 20 results
are only three days worth of sample transactions which capture only periodic
message exchange for sampling purpose.
Similarly, refer to Figure 5.5 which is the graphical illustration of the table
above shows how the monitoring is being performed. It shows ART calculated
with their associated log files which show SLA compliance however those three
anomalies which are displayed above the SLA threshold line are those entries
that didn‘t comply with the SLA as computed by the FEP module configured
within CSS monitoring.
Reviewing Response Time Variation
Here we would analyze the response time variations which could occur for many
reasons within the cloud computing environment. A response time is when
a certain job is submitted to the serving node and when it gets completed,
the time it takes is denoted as the net response time. Within our experiment,
we measure this time for every single transaction however the SLA violation
context will only be measured upon the ART for the entire specified period
(e.g. end of the day/ business (peak/off-peak) hours).
Figure 5.6 correlates the Table 5.10 which observes response time variation
if the number of users is increased to meet CSS‘s business requirements, would
ultimately affect the SLA response time by increasing it higher than the
projected response time. Therefore, adding more requests simultaneously
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Figure 5.5: SLA Violations & Average Response Times
would result in a longer response time. This leads the situation towards SLA
violation as the assertion duration can not be met until the SLA is altered
accordingly.
Reviewing Net Message Exchanges
Fig 5.8 mimics the client‘s monitoring dashboard with the total number of
transactions, regardless of their (successful/ failed) status throughout a service
delivery day. We notice that those days when SLA violations were observed
process a reasonable number of total transactions however these message
exchanges don‘t fulfill the business requirements by responding to them within
the agreed and graceful time/ QoS. Most of these HTTP requests are completed
within a longer response time than expected. This observation constitutes
rather a poor QoS sample. This interpretation trails a service situation where
a lack of service quality without compromising the quantity of the transaction.
The message exchange happens however the projected SLA is objectionable
when financial commitments are concerned. We also drew a scenario from our
test transmission that various occurrences under different time groups can be
classified. Extending our SLA monitoring further, the instance 5.6 could also
observe a particular time group when several requests were dealt with by the
service provider in a peak or off-peak time.
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Table 5.10: Response Time Variation
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The TTP only gets involved when an anomaly is observed by active FEP
modules. Initially, good service metrics correlating the actual SLA, are sub-
mitted to the TTP as a business obligation within our suggested protocol.
This practice assists future reconciliation when settling any potential service
disputes between participants.
This monitoring segment reviews those service delivery panics detected
at TTP‘s end. As Fig 5.9 shows, three service anomalies are detected by the
CSS‘s FEP module hence these anomalies are eventually acknowledged to the
TTP‘s FEP module. TTP alerts the CSP‘s FEP module to verify and resolve
these disputes by issuing a fair service credit or by repaying the equivalent
payments.
The Fig 5.9 therefore, presents how often the TTP gets involved. During
our test transmission TTP is involved about three times. The FEP modules at
TTP would get these signals from CSS to examine these service compromises
after eliminating any probabilities of having false positives. Upon every SLA
violation signal, the TTP would execute an observatory module scripted with
the following code:
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Figure 5.6: Service Response Time Variations
x >= 50ms
if x >= 50ms then
print "Warning!!!...SLA violation Detected"\\
or sends an alert via
SIEM (SMS or email)
else
print "Transactions are SLA compliant"
The module sitting at TTP with the above code would systematically
manage the transactions and controls the dispute resolution by classifying with
both, SLA COMPLIANT or NON−COMPLIANT messages.
In this chapter, we have provided a methodology for SLA enforcement. A
small implementation was carried out to demonstrate how the prototype works
under preset assumptions with variance operating and configuration settings.
It does show the viability of our brief and restricted implementation. The
test-bed also opens some of the useful avenues which will be helpful for further
extending the implementation scope using versatile operating assumptions.
Such modifications will certainly improve the protocol’s functionalities for
















Monthly Service Delivery ART Variation
ART<=50ms
ART >50ms
Figure 5.7: SLA Violations & Average Response Times
It also discovers how the implementation on the cloud environment and
how underlying technologies can be trusted and connected to achieve data
security, privacy while maintaining the automation perspective. This includes
connecting various services and APIs so to check the possibilities of how the
protocol would act. Certainly, this requires in-depth cloud deployment which is
kept for future work. Despite all that, we were able to deploy our arrangement
using a couple of cloud environments and were able to produce some useful and
very encouraging results which depict how our protocol governs the service and
the SLA management by not only monitoring or detecting but also enforce it.
The next chapter explores other protocol variance by evaluating and model-
ing, those possibilities when participants are intending to act maliciously. How
their misbehaving intention can affect fairness at the end of the service term
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The global technology industry heavily investing to ensure cloud migration
by eliminating the legacy concept of conventional on-premise computing infra-
structure to cloud computing spectrum, where various on-demand computing
services are offered in a more convenient and resilient manner, serving end-users.
This adaption trend still shows a huge number where multi-tiered cloud services
are assisting businesses around the globe, regardless of their business size or
type, by hosting their computing needs from simple web-based applications
to complex distributed networks connecting B2B through the most innovative
technologies. Since the global pandemic situation arose, where remote working
has become a norm. Gartner’s trend [191] shows how more and more global
businesses are being attracted to switch their services to the cloud environ-
ments, which resolves the remote working issues by keeping their business
liabilities significantly reduced. The said report forecasts that public cloud
services to grow 6.3% in the year 2020. Among various cloud services, certainly,
the SaaS is yet the most demanding service for assisting enterprises to embrace
online office automation software suits by paying online subscriptions, which
minimizes licensing implications, software assets maintainability, and their
security elements.
Above computing trends, do bring some diverse challenges too for their
subscribers who are registering their business interests towards these cloud
technologies. As we learned previously in Chapter 2 about SLAs and their
implications. Although, SLA being a prime legal contract between a CSP and
the CSS, does enable both the participants accountable and provide a sense of
protection, however, there are still a lot of associated challenges security issues,
which could easily be exploited when a business entity decides to misbehave
and be unfair with their other business counterpart. There are times when such
87
behaviours are not intentionally aiming for damage to someone. It could be a
human error or an unpredicted machine fault or even a process failure. Des-
pite SLA bindings, which provide guidance about SLA compliance, violation,
accountability, dispute resolution, and lodging claim (service credits/financial
refunds), before their unresolved disputes reach out to the court of law for
proceeding litigations.
In Chapter 5 a use case was reviewed when participating entities were loss
averse and the suggested protocol depicted how automated SLA enforcement
was achieved. Now If another scenario is discussed where participating entities
demonstrate some anomalous behaviour, as such landscape is depicted in Fig.6.3.
For instance, if the CSS believes that the CSP has not been provisioning their
digital items/services as anticipated. Upon raising the concern the burden of
proof is getting on the CSS’s to satisfy their claims. Similarly, the CSP believes
that CSS has not paid for its services. This is how during a service term either
of the participants may decide to act maliciously. One option is to resolve
mutually which is unlikely the case as the CSS won’t have the capability to
get low-level service metrics from CSP’s environments. Another option is to
escalates the case to the legal framework, again there are bright chances too
that the burden of proof will be on the complainant. Modern legal frameworks,
do appreciate and encourage to initiate some other alternatives to negotiate
their service disputes out before the matter is escalated to the court. Other
alternatives as discussed previously are mediators, arbitrators who can assist
to resolve issues compensating and renegotiating for highlighted disputed SLA
violations.
As a matter of fact, litigation or lawsuits can cost time and fortune in
terms of financial commitments to a complainant. To resolve SLAs disputes,
exploring some automated solutions would be very encouraged. That’s how
none of the participants may criticise such a dispute resolution mechanism.
The prototype in Chapter 5 would not work for malicious participants. As
CSS receives a periodic SLA summary report from CSP which helps them
to reconcile their usage and most importantly the fact if the SLA has been
violated or not in the past service term. Now to overcome this fear what if the
CSP decides to tamper the contents of their periodic SLA summary file prior
to dispatching it to the CSS. Their motivation could be to fake the bad-looking
SLA metrics to cheat the CSS as if the SLA is meeting their expectations. CSS
would not be able to detect such alterations.
Other potential threats may add more complexities and make this digital
service trading platform a hostile environment that requires extended security
and privacy measures. Previous architecture only supports an exchange envir-
onment where loss aversion is handled by involving an in-line TTP. When the
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operating situation gets changed that protocol would require some ultimate
modification to cope with the extent of emerging threats that could handle
malicious participants.
As Chapter 5, discusses the protocol’s various properties, the said protocol
will be mainly working on weak fairness. Weak fairness holds such attributes
which warrant gathering sufficient piece of (forensically sound) evidence using
different security apertures such as secure coprocessors, fully homomorphic
encryption modules, etc. Such arrangements can not only collect provable
evidence but can also ensure a reliable dispute resolution functionality. Non-
repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of receipt are the prime properties
that satisfy Confidentiality Integrity and Availability aka as CIA triad.[59, 81,
169]
6.1 Architecture Threat Model
Threat modeling offers a methodical mechanism to evaluate any security weak-
nesses of existing or novel system architecture or a related process. It reveals
where and how an attacker or a malicious business participant can exploit or
misbehave to subvert security and the fairness elements of a machine, service,
or process in place. A threat is, therefore, a signposting of those unprotected
(system or design) fault(s) which potentially could cause some damage, so,
threat modeling is the technique that maps those unseen threats so the relevant
mitigation measures can be actioned. Threat modeling assists a team while
reviewing the security around the project implementation towards spontaneous
facts which could halt a service if a malicious actor machine/human could get
involved at any stage using any exploit at any time [186]. That risky entity
whether it could be a service provider, service object, transaction component or
even a supporting entity with a capability to exploit via a threat agent. This
could eventually lead to further privilege escalation into the targeted systems
or service operations.
Previously, in Chapter 5, we presented a novel prototype with an operating
environment that demonstrates a service exchange where prime participants
are known as lose averse. Now using a new operating dimension and applying
a proactive approach, we do protocol’s wargaming, which depicts certain
adversarial scenarios. This will let us review and discuss a participant’s
malicious intents and their associated mitigation steps. During the protocol run,
in either case, one or both protocol’s participants, if decide to act maliciously,
what are the options how our protocol would interact the situation to take
over and off course remedial arrangements. For instance what PA, upon the
















Trusted AuthorityCloud Service Subscriber
Figure 6.1: Cloud Service Exchange Basic Model
the protocol would have an end with either one of the following four eventual
states, denoted as St.
• St(1,1) constitutes a successful exchange, where it has received both
MB and AckB(A). It would further facilitate to computes IB from MB
for having both the keys KA and KB.
• St(1,0) a state where this participant has received MB but not AckB(A),
If it is in SA(1,0), it asks the TTP to resolve the exchange by sending
message ResA that contains both MA and MB. (See row 4 of Table 1.)
• St(0,0) where it has received neither,
• St(0,1) where it has received only AckB(A). ,PA requests the TTP to
abort the exchange by sending message ReqA that contains MA.”
6.1.1 Basic Service Exchange Model - Potential Threats
Refer to Fig 6.1, which depicts a generic cloud service exchange model, where
six diverse transaction participants, methodically interact with each other.
Both the CSP and the CSS, sub-delegate their trusted authorities (TAs) to
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Figure 6.2: Potential Threats from CSP to CSS & from CSS to CSP
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perform verifications and offer guarantees on behalf of CSS and CSP, when
and where needed or upon receiving some instructions from TTP itself.
These verifications correspond to cover their specific items for instance a
certificate authority (CA) would cover CSP’s by acting as their TA, whereas,
a financial clearinghouse such as a bank, represents the CSS instead, ensuring
payment guarantees on their behalf, if and when TTP, mediates any disputes
between them. A critical review of the service exchange model discovers
few threats on both sides of the communication channels and within their
corresponding trust boundaries. This demands to advocate some best solutions
which can mitigate those threats so both participants can have an intuitive fair
exchange by perceiving a dispute resolution mechanism based upon manually
assisted (using trusted parties) or fully automatically (using some smart secure
technologies) architectures.
6.1.2 When CSS Acts Maliciously
CSS-T1: Being a malicious participant, the CSS can either decide to stop/
refuse their payment(s), even though CSP fully provisioned their cloud services.
A CSS may choose not paying them at all, pay an incorrect amount, pay late,
or could demonstrate a similar unexpected behaviour which deprives the CSP
to get their due payments. For instance, the CSS shows their grievance that
SLA was only met for 48 weeks within the (52 weeks) service term, perhaps
CSS may have observed some indicators of SLA violations (such as poor QoS,
being provisioned with an incorrect digital service which doesn’t match the
agreed product specification and their business requirements as mentioned in
SLA), therefore, accusing the CSP. Paying inadequately or incorrectly would
still be considered in the same terms as not paying at all. Another similar,
scenario where CSS could attempt to cheat by getting the items(service credits
/financial refunds) twice by (a) using the cloud service provisioned by the CSP
and claiming they didn’t get it so, that’s how the CSS might try to have both,
by escalating the issue through the TTP.
CSS-M1: This threat can be mitigated by seeking an assisted dispute resol-
ution through trusted parties such as TTP and corresponding TAs. Regardless
of any of the above CSS’s deception states (mentioned in T1), if the CSP
doesn’t get their due payment, the case can eventually be escalated to the
TTP, who will review the CSP’s claim and performs its due verification and
reconciliation using their copy of the SLA and rest of the message contents
furnished by the victimized party (e.g. the CSP here), which was initially
shared by exchange participants, at the time of exchange set-up/ initialization
phase. It develops a fork situation:
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[CSP Agrees the Provisioning the Service X  for Service Term Time T]
[CSP Terminates the Service X as SLACSS  
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[CSP Sends aSinged SLACSP to TTP]
 [Communication Channel between CSS & it's Client "ClientCSS" ] [CSP Provisions the Service X  to the Client for CSS for Term Time T]
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[CSP Sends the SLA Summary to CSS]
[CSS initiates the Service Exchange by Acquiring Service X 
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Figure 6.3: CSS Threat Points
• Use Case (a): If the CSS claim is true that SLA was factually violated (e.g.
between week 48-52) during the service term, the TTP, therefore, would
instruct the CSP to compensate the CSS to resolve the matter, declaring
the CSS being honest here. The CSS can get their due compensation (eg.
service credits/ payment refunds, etc.) via TTP, forwarded by TACSP
based upon a standing instruction issued by the CSP) and the matter
will get resolved and the threat is confronted in this way. Furthermore,
CSS cannot get both the item from the CSP and the claim the credit as
well for the same item specification. This claim will be reconciled and
verified at the TTP with the collaboration of TACSP who would verify
that either the service item was fully utilized or the service credit was
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issued.
• Use Case (b): Emerges with a scenario, where the CSP is now proven to
be honest and CSS tries to cheat the exchange means the SLA violation
cannot be established through TTP’s reconciliation and verification
checks. This would lead to a state, where TTP, issues a set of instructions
to the TACSS to generate the payment item(s) (as the CSS gave them
TACSS this mandate at the beginning of the exchange to furnish financial
guarantees, when needed), the correct payment item will be generated
and will be sent to the CSP, which can resolve the dispute and mitigate
this part of the threat.
CSS-T2 CSS or an Attacker tampers the Contents (data/files) During the
service exchange, the CSP will have to send a periodic (monthly, quarterly)
SLA summary to the CSS, which warrants final settlement payments to the
CSP, if and only if, during the full-service term there was no SLA violation.
A couple of scenarios arise here when CSP sends their SLA summary to the
CSS, either the data gets modified during the flight halfway through, or it’s
intentionally modified upon landing on the CSS‘s computing estate by one of
their insiders.
• Use Case (a): The CSS is well aware the fact, that the payment can be
stopped if the SLA summary proves that during the service term, there
has been few SLA violations. Taking this note into the consideration, a
malicious CSS can attempt to fabricate the summary report using various
sophisticated (anti-forensic) tools & techniques to avoid any detection.
CSS can then claim their case stating they will not pay because the SLA
summary they received, clearly shows service was not SLA compliant
and CSS eventually will escalate the matter to the TTP, who will review
it against the SLA and will ask for the refund to be issued to the CSS
through the TACSP .
• Use Case (b): [MitM/MiTC tampers the contents] Now, another threat
materializes when again the CSS gets a pre-modified version of the SLA
summary sent to them by the CSP through untrusted networks. MiTM
(Man-in-the-Middle) or MiTC (Man-in-the-Cloud) attack compromises
the channel, the attacker modified the data and sends to the CSS, im-
personating the contents are generated by the CSP avoiding any sort of
attack detection.
CSS-M2: : This situation can be dealt, by using anti-tampering and privacy
preservation techniques, preventing not only exchange participants but those
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attackers who could gain unauthorized access through the untrusted channels.
If a joint security protection regime is implemented on untrusted channels
and within participants corresponding computing estate, this threat can easily
be mitigated. Data on transit (untrusted communication links) and data at
rest (participants computing estate) are somehow prone to various vulner-
abilities and (physical/ logical) security attacks, which can be exploited by
attacking entities (whichever insiders and/or outsiders) the targeted exchange
platforms. Adapting Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) can provision
information privacy issues which obstructs by eliminating the chances of MitM
(Man-in-the-Middle) & MiTC (Man-in-the-Cloud) attacks [102]. Extending
this protection by also implementing the Security Modules such as Secure
Coprocessors technologies (IBM secure coprocessors), would ultimately prevent
the insiders to perform any sort of tampering with the data, hence, eradicating
insider attacks.
6.1.3 When CSP Acts Maliciously
While reviewing potential threats comparing CSP and CSS, one can tell
that CSP being the infrastructure and service producer, can cause multiple
adversaries to compare to CSS. A CSP, with a malicious intention, holds more
business reasons, technical means, and logical implications to be unfair with
one or more service subscribers on their tenant’s stack. Refer to the threats
landscape presented Fig. 6.4, where, a CSP could pose many threats to the
CSS such as forfeiting their financial items, unsolicited modification of their
service provisioning, data security, privacy preservation elements. Following
details these threat elements and suggests potential mitigations.
CSP-T1: Assuming the fact that CSS is the entity within this exchange
frame, who has to pay in advance, even before their intended digital services are
provisioned on their desired platform. A CSP gets the payment at the set-up
phase. Now when the CSS has paid upfront to the CSS whereas their expected
service provisioned has not yet been carried out by the CSP, a malicious CSP
could deny CSS’s payment. Within the modern-day digital economy, where
both the buyer and seller are anonymous, yet buyers do make payments to
sellers first.
CSP-M1: To deal with this threat, a well collaborated integration of trusted
third party along with corresponding trusted authorities representing buyer and
seller, resolves the problem here. A TTP can be approached by the buyer when
their expected items/ services are not delivered as per the seller’s contractual
obligation. TTP works as an arbitrator with more powers to prevent these
participants to formally approach the regional legal framework to seek the
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resolution. TTP, once the fact is established who the culprit is, informs them
to resolve the matter, in this case, the CSP would be instructed to either
arrange a payment refund or deliver the promised service at CSS’s platform
as they both initially agreed. As suggested, to distribute the segregation of
duties, each business entity also has sub-contracted TA, who would guarantee
on their client’s behalf, to regenerate their items (either digital service or
financial items), upon receiving TTP’s instruction, to do so. This arrangement
would relieve participants while agreeing to an exchange set-up where they
can confidently negotiate any unexpected post-exchange disputes and their
corresponding resolutions. It eventually gains trustworthiness, between, CSS
and the CSP, by maintaining their full anonymity.
[CSP Agrees the Provisioning the Service X  for Service Term Time T]
[CSP Terminates the Service X as SLACSS  
is Compliant]
[CSP Sends aSinged SLACSP to TTP]
 [Communication Channel between CSS & it's Client "ClientCSS" ] [CSP Provisions the Service X  to the Client for CSS for Term Time T]
Step 5
[CSP Sends the SLA Summary to CSS]
[CSS initiates the Service Exchange by Acquiring Service X 
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CSP-T2: This presents yet another set of threats where a misbehaving CSP
could try not to deliver services at all, delivers them partially, or some service
state which is not acceptable and expected by their subscriber. Further, defining
the adversary extent, let’s say that a service is assumed NOT DELIVERED if it
has got poor QoS, broken links, or even a service with unsuitability, uncertainty
which eventually ends up causing unscheduled outages. The scope of this threat
also covers other elements such as if the CSP tries to provision fewer resources
reciprocal of what was originally agreed on the SLA. For instance, it provisions
less anticipated CPU cycles, memory/ storage allocation, low bandwidth, or
anything which compromises prime SLO defined on the SLA and breaches the
exchange fairness or atomicity. All these scenarios could deprive the CSS, who
has already paid the service provider upfront and now being victimized by not
getting their due digital items or services.
CSP-M2: The above-mentioned threats (T2) can also be managed using
TTP and TA-based assisted architecture. Whatever is classified under poor
QoS or SLA compliance issues, can be alerted to the TTP. The TTP will receive
the entire data and the metadata along with CSS’s escalation for disputed
service elements. The TTP runs its verification processes and comes to a
conclusion, in this case, where we assume the CSP has demonstrated cheating
their subscriber, will be held responsible. TTP will communicate with the
TACSP , who holds an escrow to resolve such disputes. TTP doesn’t directly
communicate with the CSP to enquire the case as CSS provided factual sheet
can be compared what should have been delivered and what service delivery is
made. TACSP will regenerate the item to compensate the CSS with either a
financial refund, service credits, or extending the service term to cover their
losses, and that show this problem can be resolved.
CSP-T3: We assume that once the SLA is signed, the service exchange is
initiated and delivered. The CSP is obliged to send a periodic SLA summary.
This informative document is a vital piece of evidence as (a) it convinces and
justifies the CSS for their true return of investment (RoI), (b) this is the only
information on basis of which the service recipient e.g. the CSS can tell if
the SLA has been honored by the CSP. It tells when and how the SLA was
compliant or violated. The CSS can only make their claim on these grounds if
the SLA summary shows any SLA violations. Here the misbehaving CSP could
turn the table by not dispatching the agreed SLA summary to the CSS, at all
or not at least in time. There are other possibilities of how a malicious CSP
can deprive the CSS in terms of delivering the correct SLA summary, which
will be discussed in (T4). Another possibility can also not be ruled out if the
SLA summary was sent by the CSP however, it was intercepted by a middle
97
attacker who either doesn’t send it to the CSS or perhaps sends a modified
version of it which impersonates that the action is initiated by the CSP.
CSP-M3: Above discussed threats where CSP intentionally fails, it’s an
obligation by not dispatching the SLA summary can invalidate the service
exchange as the CSS won’t be able to reconcile the QoS against the SLA hence
potentially oppressed economically by the CSP. Incorporating TTP and TAs
can also resolve the problem. A CSS, upon not receiving the SLA summary,
can initiate the complaint through the TTP to resolve the matter. The TTP
who also holds a copy of SLA (which was supplied by both these participants)
verifies the claim and instructs the CSP to send the SLA summary so the CSS
can perform their reconciliation for either a potential service renewal if the
service was SLA compliant, if not they can claim their due refund. In case,
if it proves that the provisioned service wasn’t SLA compliance the TTP will
again be approached to arrange a refund by directing the TACSP to resolve
the matter. Implanting a secure coprocessor can also facilitate which will
ensure the SLA summary is automatically sent to the CSS on the scheduled
date/time. It certainly eliminates any manual processing or an adversarial
process infiltration by the CSP to mitigate these threats. Lastly, the middle
attacker can also be dealt with by implementing fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) which can repel any potential attackers who try to compromise the
untrusted communication channels. Even if they even manage to break in or
any attempt towards data exfiltration, due to FHE implementation, they won’t
be able to gain any useful information out.
CSP-T4 A CSP can become an adversary by performing various tampering
attempts on both the CSS data and of those digital artifacts they gain while
computing or processing their requests. The results are not only produced on
their infrastructure but also stored, networked, and of course, transmitted to
the CSS or on their behalf as agreed. Some generic tampering may involve as:
• Intentional modification to SLOs such as ART, Latency
• Malicious, unsolicited tampering to system/ infrastructural configs
• Modification/ tampering to results or SLA summary to mimic variant
results to constitute an impression of SLA compliance rather than SLA
violation.
• Modification/ tampering to Access Control List (ACL) to either down-
grade authorized users approved by the CSS or to perform unauthorized
privilege escalation of CSS users or CSP’s own data center engineers.
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• The possibility of an external attacker can also not be ignored as if using
untrusted networks or security vulnerabilities they can compromise and
tamper the message exchange by leaving no footprints behind by avoiding
detection.
CSP-M4: Various elements of the above threat entail one single agenda
that how to prevent the tampering whether it’s being performed by the CSP
or perhaps an external attacker. The ultimate solution to this problem is
wrapping up both the processing units and communication channels so both
these avenues become (a) inaccessible to both the CSP or the external attacker.
The most secure and appropriate mitigation within the CSP’s trust boundary
is to deploy secure coprocessors such as IBM secure coprocessor family eg
IBM4578 or any of their predecessor CPUs. Implementing this secure module,
provisions an ultimate security shield through which a malicious CSP or any
of the exchange participant cannot tamper or make any similar unsolicited
changes to some agreed processes or data, to cheat the other. Similarly, if
the data passes through these secure modules, a similar arrangement on the
message recipient end can gain some meaningful information out of it. Keeping
middle external attackers in mind, we also suggest putting another security
shell by implementing fully homomorphic encryption, which would eliminate
any remaining threats whatsoever from attackers aiming the data-on-flight
through untrusted communication channels.
CSP-T5: CSP can exploit the client/ CSS data privacy. The external
attacker can also exploit the same by attacking the mediating communication
channel]. When a CSP acts maliciously, to gain some financial or technical
gains and perhaps to feed some other curiosity if they can attempt to tamper
their customer’s data, certainly they are also fully capable of compromising
data privacy. This gain ultimately costs the customer then and there or maybe
later as being the infrastructure owner a CSP can intercept, record, and sell
customer’s data. Privacy exploit can also be threatened by external attackers,
who can sniff the network traffic between two participants and can benefit the
service provider to earn some reputation, fame, or even financial means. If the
external attacker can compromise the untrusted channels using various tools,
techniques, these sort of privacy compromises can bring the victimized party
to their knees.
CSP-M5 Privacy threat also extends CSS challenges to an extra mile. If
CSP compromises their subscriber’s data privacy and when CSS doesn’t have
any access to obtain any evidence, it put the CSS in a situation. CSP remains
undetected while compromising data privacy which might be too sensitive or
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business-critical. The problem can also be resolved by implementing secur-
ity modules at the processing points and adapting homomorphic encryption
guarantees the data at transit will be secure.
6.1.4 Service Exchange Interactions
The following steps show, how participants interact with each other, while a
basic service exchange is being performed. This includes interaction setting
up, initialization, exchange, abort/ termination phases, and finally, it briefly
explains, how dispute resolution work. This interaction would ascertain, the
foundations and theory of need, when and why a new architecture is inevitable,
and how it would resolve many issues, in the modern cloud era.
Setup Phase
• Step 1: At the initialization phase, both the main participants establish
their service deal when the CSS accepts an intended cloud service or
even a compute functionality advertised by the CSP against some specific
amount. This service will be processed on CSP-owned infrastructure or
data centre facilities. CSS sends an upfront payment token along with
service specification (e.g. compute, network, storage, etc.) to the CSP.
Within Step 1, CSS also defines the service term, SLA (highlighted with
certain SLOs) specifications in it so CSP can review and agree upon
them.
• Step 2: CSP, upon receiving the message via Step 1, reviews it against
these on-demand services, sought by the CSS. It verifies the service
availability, provisioning implications, and term time and payments made
by the CSS to validate them all on a mutually agreed SLA. If all items
are correct and acceptable, the CSP will proceed, otherwise, will decide
to quit the protocol, by letting the TTP know about this termination.
Initialization Phase
• Step 3a & Step 3b: Once agreed, both the CSP and CSS send signed
copies of the SLA and acknowledge their receipts using Step 3a and Step
3b, respectively.
• Step 4a & 4b: Upon receipt of the signed SLA by both these parti-
cipants, TTP dispatches its acknowledgment to both, the CSS and the
CSP separately, through Step 4a and Step 4b.
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Exchange Phase
• Step 5: This step indicates that CSP provisions the on demand X cloud
services at the ClientCSS environment on behalf of the CSS at TP-F
point as shown on the Fig 6.3(CSS Threat Points). The service will be
initiated until the end of the agreed term on the client site TP-F.
• Step 6: CSP is obliged to send a periodic SLA summary to the CSS at
the end of each service term for reconciliation purposes. This transmission
helps the CSS to ascertain whether there are any potential SLA violations
during the service term or if the entire service was delivered as SLA
compliant. If the SLA summary is not sent by the CSP, the CSS, being
the service subscriber won’t able to verify the SLA contents and will be
losing their return of investment (RoI). Upon receiving and reviewing
these statistics, enable the CSS to either approve the final payment tokens
via TACSS , or, instruct, not to proceed if there are any ambiguities are
discovered. There is a potential threat where (i) CSS, itself can tamper
the SLA summary as depicts under (CSS-T2) to fabricate some SLA
violations so to avoid payments or even claim falsified service credits/
refunds or (ii)an external attacker (MitM) can modify the SLA summary
so when it gets to the CSS, it depicts those arbitrary SLA metrics and
cause a deception.
Abort/Termination Phase [Normal/ Abnormal Termination]
• Step 7: In an idealistic environment, if both the CSS and the CSP
have been honest while exchanging their items, there, normal protocol
termination can be expected. CSS will initiate this termination indicating
having a fair service delivery, unless they want to have it renewed or in
case of the dispute arises, the termination will not occur. Furthermore,
if CSS is satisfied with the CSP’s service provisioning, till the end of
the agreed term, either the CSS terminates the channel, indicating the
end of the service. However, there is a flip side of this scenario that
when the CSS, decides to act maliciously by committing an exceptional
termination because CSS did not want to pay to the CSP showing as a
potential threat (CSS-T1) for some reason. This will be caught during a
future reconciliation done by the CSP, who, in that case, will approach
the TTP claiming that the CSS violates the SLA. The dispute resolution
procedure is triggered.
• Step 8: Finally, if all goes smooth, CSP also acknowledges the protocol’s
normal termination until he receives a service renewal request made by
CSS. Now, if there is any dispute between them, the TTP takes care
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of those calls by liaising with every participant’s corresponding trusted
authorities such as TACSP or TACSS .
Dispute Resolution Dispute resolution constitutes a state when either
party raises an alarm that the other participant has been unfair to them by
either not making the payment or not sending the expected item in return.
Above mentioned scenario also demonstrates some threat points, during an end-
to-end service exchange. For instance, a dispute could arise when the CSS acts
maliciously such as CSS-T1 when they do not pay their dues to the CSP and
on anther point CSS-T2 when they manipulate SLA summary by tampering
with service stats faking SLA violations, to avoid any payments. The flip
side also shows, when when the CSP demonstrate the similar misbehaviour as
illustrated through CSP-T1, CSP-T2, CSP-T3, CSP-T4 and CSP-T5 detailed
above. This depicts the basic service exchange threat posture of how the CSS
can be deprived, who will be obliged to seek some sort of compensation from
a trusted third party (TTP). This brings fork a state where the disputes can
be dealt with manually or by introducing some novel architecture, the entire
process can be automated where there are least chances of having any disputes
are arose, from either participant.
1. Outsourced Dispute Resolution Protocol (ODRP) [With Dis-
pute Resolution] While observing the above mentioned service ex-
change as Fig 6.1(Service Exchange Basic Model). where both CSS
and CSP, do not trust each other, therefore, they act cautiously by
outsourcing their liabilities through external guarantors called trusted
authorities (TAs). The TTP being a mediator, are duly authorized by
the exchange parties by having a mandate to either enquire or direct to
regenerate CSS or CSP’s items respectively, in case either of them does
not behave as expected.
2. Automated Dispute Resolution Protocol (ADRP) [Without Dis-
pute Resolution] Another dimension to resolve the dispute resolution
automatically by ensuring an end to end security, privacy, anonymity
more effectively and efficiently to use encryption and anti-tampering mod-
ules whether the data is being at rest, transit even going through some
compute processes. This is the novelty of our new proposed architecture
that the data will eventually be decrypted at some stage, this phenomena
raises concerns and associates a lot of supplemented risks especially when
data is being decrypted at the service provider’s end, kept within their
trust boundaries or even while traveling through untrusted channels, the
privacy and security risk are intact. To overcome these risks we suggest
an architecture based upon fair exchange protocol, using a combination
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of encryption and anti-tampering innovations for absolute peace of mind,
which will be described shortly. Our architecture is not only offering
security at both the participant’s end but it also wraps extra security
layers to protect the information while the data is traveling through
wires.
6.2 Mitigating Malicious Participants
Critically reviewing the basic service exchange model and associated threats
potentially expected from either CSS or CSP as highlighted in Fig 6.5 (Union
of threat points - CSS & CSP). This mapping introduces some key threats
which give an impression that at what stage, which prime service exchange
entity could act maliciously to gain some benefits suits them.
Presenting a basic service exchange model draws a correlation of a state
when cloud services are being provisioned. Cloud based services are deployed
for a cost paid by their subscribers for an agreed service term. Service provi-
sioning comes with some assurances and guarantees which includes ensuring
data security, privacy and availability along with a good acceptable QoS. These
major service aspects are primarily monitored, managed and supervised by
CSPs. There are other subsequent entities can be involved such as TTPs and
TAs. Digital services are often provisioned to the end user sites on behalf of
CSS. We assume that among these six main service exchange participants,
TTP, TA and the Client all are trusted participants and for the time being,
discussing their security and misbehaviour is out of the scope for this discussion.
Our research demands to focus on the remaining two participants e.g. CSS and
CSP and their interaction with each other and how they can misbehave and
circumvent the base line security arrangements. Misbehaving participants could
also extend their curiosity by compromising properties features a digital service
exchange for instance the exchange fairness, atomicity, correctness, autonomy,
timing constants, effectiveness, efficiency, trust and non-repudiations.
There are few solutions presented as discussed in Chapter 3 however, this
research couldn’t find such a solution that can empower the cloud services in
terms of upholding the problem of fair exchange aiming an autonomous SLA
enforcement solution that covers the majority of the highlighted threats within
a single architecture. The previous section highlights various threats and also
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Every single innovation always brings some safety and security concerns, there-
fore, manufacturers or technology regulators do publish prevention measures
against those potential risks. Since cloud-based service provisioning has become
a business norm as all the known industries have somehow commissioned these
platforms, similarly, cloud services do bring a variety of risks with them. A
CSP owns a slightly bigger chunk of such liabilities and obligations as they own
their data centres client’s data is processed, stored, shared, and transmitted.
Some of the critical risky factors are also secretly shifted towards the service
subscribers by these CSPs. Violating good usage policy, service & data in-
fringements, licensing obligations, over usage of virtual resources (by cracking
the security controls), non-payments, QoS monitoring, and claiming service
credits are some of those issues which could occur during a service provisioning.
A CSP on another side with multi-tenancy capabilities could be even more
prone to such misbehavior by stealing systems resources (CPU cycles, memory
or storage) from one of their low prioritize client and deploying them to a high
profile customer for increasing their profit are also possible[96, 101, 194]. Such
malicious intentions are potentially be carried out while leaving no tangible
forensics evidence so that a less-privileged CSS cannot detect and claim such
technical theft. While working on the above-mentioned proposed architectures,
we also considered malicious attackers, who could either be working for their
unfair economical gains asking for serious ransom money or they might be
state-sponsored actors trying to target a business [15, 184, 199]. The work on
this thesis was initiated with a conceptual model[160], considering the SLA
enforcement is a problem of fair exchange. The causality behind this approach
was the service provisioning when CSS signs service and the CSP deploys the
service on CSS’s platform. In this chapter, readers will be able to examine how
multiple security and economic scenarios are treated when a cloud service is
deployed. These diverse operating states urge for a solution that alleviates the
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prime objective to have automated SLA enforcement in place. Additionally, it
also capable of ensuing protective security layers shielding participant’s data
and privacy with minimal trust deficit throughout the exchange process. The
solution can also collaborate occasional and measured assistance of trusted
parties such as TTP and TAs.
7.1 Protocol’s Varying Scenarios & Challenges
We initially marked for two service exchange scenarios e.g. (a) when our
nominated participants (CSP and CSS) are either loss averse OR (b) when
either or both participants act maliciously so to have unsolicited gains over
the other participants which is the prime objective of FEP. Here both the
analysis can be found, which discusses architecture implementations, operating
environment, assumptions, challenges, and scope. Following the discussion
will not only cover the CSP or the CSS but it would also frame how external
attackers can attempt to break the running cloud services or perhaps target
communication mediums on untrusted networks where they can steal some
useful information or at least they can disrupt business as usual (BAU) services
or cause a process failure or modify system behaviour.
7.1.1 Architecture I: Implantation Scenario, Challenges & Scope
While working on the prototype implementation, several avenues, challenges,
and properties were studied to achieve results for our FEP based architec-
tures. Following are some of those bullet points which give insights into our
implementation and shed light on different research dimensions and other
avenues.
Possible TTP Implementation: Typically, a TTP in fair exchange is
thought of as a trusted “institution”, which will be able to enforce the fair
exchange. However, this does not have to be the case and, in certain cases such
as SLA enforcement, not desirable. On the realization of TTP, my research
envisages that it can be implemented as a replicated state machine using the
atomic broadcast protocol of Internet-scale systems like ZooKeeper [98]. How-
ever, if TTP nodes can experience Byzantine faults (malicious intrusions), then
robust protocols such as [45] need to be used; these protocols involve several
rounds of message exchanges and may not scale. Alternatively, one could also
explore the emerging Blockchain technology combined with smart contracts.
Our colleague’s recent work [128] on eVoting using Ethereum Blockchain mo-
tivates the possibility of similarly building TTP for scalable fair-exchange
applications.
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Fair Exchange Issues: My SLA enforcement protocol requires the TTP to be
active, i.e., the protocol requires an online TTP, increasing the communication
overhead. However, this needs not to be the case since we assume the parties
to be loss averse, hence an optimistic fair exchange type of protocol would
have sufficed. However, in line with our future work on making the SLA
enforcement resilient, we have chosen not to pursue an optimistic FE protocol.
Similarly, given loss averse parties, nonces are not strictly required as loss
averse participants rule out replay attacks. Finally, our protocol presents
stateless TTP, i.e., the state is reset once a given round is complete. However,
the protocol can be easily instrumented to make state persist across multiple
rounds.
Architecture Limitations: As mentioned previously we collected these
results on separate cloud-based entities rather than monitoring them on the
end-user‘s estate. A CSP can only guarantee a request-response when it leaves
its trusted boundary into the public net. How long would it takes to get to the
end user‘s application layer comprises a multitude of factors, of which firstly
most of the CSP‘s don‘t take the responsibility at all, if some of them do, they
would add up the cost for premier service delivery for this purpose
7.1.2 Architecture II: Implantation Scenario, Challenges &
Scope
This subsection debates our second approach, where we extended our first archi-
tecture by (a) swapping participants states from loss aversion to a state where
participants are malicious (b)we change the TTP deployment from an in-line
to on-line state and (c) finally we deploy trusted authorities, sub-contracted
entities, on behalf of both, the CSP and CSS. CA play a vibrant role for
verification and validation purposes, while cloud service exchange is being
performed and how their feedback to the TTP disseminates on-demand item
guarantees.
Shedding some light on the concept, when a trading participant can act
maliciously, is the most key topic within the modern-day electronic trading
realm. Trust deficit brings the theory of escrow agreements and services.
Internet-related fraud is not a new phenomenon. Reports suggest that global e-
commerce based fraudulent figures might touch $25bn by 2024 [144]. Businesses,
therefore, are quite conscious when making deals based on e-commerce because
of this trust deficit [90]. Cloud service falls into the same category where
various global cloud services showcase their digital services and market them
using very attractive features however when the actual service is deployed to the
client site, the experience gets bitter. CSPs don’t keep their promises and after
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the service deployment cooling off period, their QoS either gets compromised
or sometimes they intentionally misbehave by not maintaining the service
stability, availability, or unauthorized cloud resource allocation to other service
tenants, which violates the SLA [190]. The entire transaction is meant to
be recorded and appropriate timely mitigation is promised however, cloud
services somehow manage to cheat their service subscribers. The behavioural
detection of a cheating business entity holds a lot of complexities and challenges
within. Stealing cloud resources [95, 172, 193] and making other potential
cheating attempts are known to the media when CSPs commit such cheating
[65]. Sometimes external actors [38] are also behind some service disruptions
to cause service outages [55, 170]. Some service subscribers could also act
maliciously when they refuse to make their payments or they perform some
service infringements [19, 44].
Possible TTP Implementation: In this architecture, the same assumption
was carried out for the TTP for them being a trusted entity same as corres-
ponding trusted authorities for CSS and CSP. In terms of TTP placement,
which makes a lot of difference in terms of calculating their response time while
entities are interacting with each other. Keeping the TTP’s online constitutes
these factors as its involvement would be only considered when necessary
such as handling disputes. While testing the architecture(I), was presented in
Chapter 5 implementation was carried out by interconnecting architectural
nodes by configuring its prime components on diverse cloud environments,
however, in the case of this architecture which holds a broader scope when
mitigating diverse set of internal and external threats.
TTP correlates on multiple communications channels while reviewing po-
tential disputes, however, the novelty of this design is that it requires least
minimal interaction to conduct thorough process and SLA verifications. Our
architecture, equipped with multiple security layers which makes it confidently
secure. TTP does review security feeds from the core component e.g. secure
co-processor modules (SCM), which sits at the very heart of this architecture.
It seamlessly protects data aiming at both security and privacy. A concern
question, that who will be watching the watchers is also addressed and promptly
mitigated by adding the module, monitoring the SCM potential tampering.
In case of a malicious actor, gets hold of the SCM firmware code possibly
from the dark web so to attack this module, the additional security aperture
would protect it. It smartly implements anti-tampering signals using a module
based upon heartbeat protocol [56, 100]. This module is capable of beaconing
real-time alarms if it detects any tampering attempts that may have been
performed by one of the participants. Such additional security arrangement
is deployed on both CSS and CSP estate to ensure a degree of fairness as
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well as data security. Finally, this architecture also considers data @ transit)
might intercepted by some (M.i.T.M), who can rage attacks on untrusted
communication channels, therefore, the implementation puts full homomorphic
encryption FHE which nails out this issue too.
This chapter cross-examines both the proposed architectures. It evaluates
and discusses how and what the protocol’s deployment can achieve when the
participants are believed to be loss averse and secondly when they are planning
to misbehave. Security constraints, resilience, and futuristic approach were
the focal points therefore, technologies like trusted modules, end-to-end data
encryption, and module’s security were ensured. We discussed the role of
TTP and associated TAs along with the potential possibilities of external
attack vectors. The next and the final chapter gives a conclusion and leaves
some thoughts for future work and extended possibilities where easing the
assumptions, switching the protocol from a synchronous to an asynchronous




Conclusion and Future Work
This research studied the cloud service fabric, focusing on SLA enforcement
regarding participants’ potential misbehavior. SLA being the key instrument is
framed by numerous tools, techniques, and procedures for compliance purposes.
Both the open-source and propitiatory solutions and frameworks, predomin-
antly focus either on SLA monitoring or detection through devising centralized
configuration management tools and related APIs. This constitutes the cloud
service provider mandate, which leaves elusive and limited options to allow
the service subscriber to share true QoS stats mirroring the low-level service
metrics while the service is being provisioned. Our proposed design of a po-
tential framework certainly opens another avenue by introducing a significant
shift of cloud service control and its provisioning, for both the CSP and the
CSS, by enforcing the SLA’s through a strictly impartial and fair-centric fashion.
Defining, implementing, and enforcing security balanced cloud SLA plays
a pivotal role for both CSS or CSS during cloud service provisioning. SLA
enforcement holds the strategic fairness aspect from initial service deploy-
ment till the end of the service term. Accomplishing cloud service objectives
against the actual delivered service and its capabilities, functionalities, critical
dependencies can only be evaluated when SLA enforcement can be ensured.
This chapter primarily concentrates on the fact that although current cloud
SLA monitoring and detection arrangements are there however such measures
are inadequate to deal with today’s threat landscape and other well-known
regulatory and legal requirements. The end of the service term often leaves
one or perhaps both the CSP or CSS, with some vague stats and service
reconciliation, which would not justify a true return of investment (RoI) until
individual and targeted service elements are examined using low-level infra-
structure investigations using approved digital forensics techniques to evaluate
service metrics are SLA compliant or not? This is generally not feasible and
mostly not permissible by the corresponding CSP, especially when cloud-based
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services are further sub-contracted using various outsourced global brokerage
service channels. This research tackles such SLA enforcement instability by
classifying it as a fair exchange problem. Fair exchange protocol is perhaps
the closest as well as the logical solution, which sets a well-defined equilibrium
to facilitate the SLA enforcement.
While subcontracting cloud services and signing their respective SLAs,
ignoring end-to-end security and privacy protection elements of an entity’s
data (at transit or rest), could become a serious risk. If one of the participants
decides to misbehave or even an invisible malicious middle actor, tries to sab-
otage service provisioning by penetrating insufficient security layers, targeting
any segment of a cloud service provisioning, can leave serious business damages.
Our proposed architectures in this thesis, fair exchange protocols, and their
sub-protocols are embedded using such a novelty, which not only eliminates
multiple technical deceptions possibilities but also adds additional security
layers to protect from various threats, posed by unknown malicious attackers
during a cloud service provisioning. These attempts, if are successful could
easily aim to deprive the targeted participant, while the service exchange is
being carried out. Our framework design also enforces other strategic security
features such as privacy and data security, shielding potential tampering at-
tempts. These attempts can easily disrupt an operational level or technical
level workflow of a web service. It can modify expected service behaviour
through mutilating resource availability, response time, latency, the ratio of
fault detection, fault tolerance, and resolution. Other issues such as unsolicited
service outages could compromise the persecuted partner’s business repute as
well their technology investment and production line.
In contrast to previous approaches, this research benefits by filling potential
gaps by integrating trusted modules such as Secure Coprocessors (addresses
data at rest), the Fully Homomorphic Encryption (addresses data at transit),
and other security modules to add an additional protective layer which makes
it even harder for an attacker or a malicious participant to attempt a service
stats, configuration changes or any kind of data modifications. As within the
information security industry, the fact is well known and well understood that
there is no 100security, therefore, there will be some limitations that could
still be exploitable by the shrewd attackers, who could still make holes to
these security walls and might tamper data at transit using modern untrusted
communication channels using special offensive tools and techniques to break
the TMP’s firmware. As the problem of SLA enforcement is well understood,
ensuring the QoS and the QoE are only achievable, if the SLA enforcement is
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automated and correctly configured on each participating node. It will eventu-
ally facilitate fairly distributed services and their corresponding elements. Our
proposed architecture restricts SLA obligations to each participant by enforcing
uninterruptible and trusted SLA monitoring, detection, and enforcement in a
single framework. It measures service values for each distributed segment and
produces transparent cloud service reconciliation metrics for a forensic-oriented
investigation, for any unresolved service disputes if arise.
Previous works resolve other associated problems partially were substantial
challenges still intact hence do warrant a solution to alleviate them. Research
studies various proposed methodologies focus on all the service element issues
from low-level metrics to high-level service availability in such an automated
way where the challenging SLA enforcement would be difficult and does not
present any sort of operational ambiguity, once tested in the real cloud environ-
ments. A methodology should also consider data privacy and security elements
where detecting and resolving SLA violations could ensure defense-in-depth.
As autonomous service control systems are rapidly taking over the digital
industry. Cloud service deployment is also taking a huge technological shift
from manually observed cloud services such as QoS controls are transitioned
towards autonomous monitoring and control sensors where the least human
interaction is needed. Although our suggested framework is in its early evolu-
tionary phases to combat the big and mystified cloud SLA problem, however,
it stills demonstrates its capabilities towards SLA enforcement with extended
security layers and smart controls. In the presence of multi-parties using fair
exchange, future objectives are to further analyze other potential assump-
tions by flipping timing models, and testing other deception and attacking
vectors and techniques to break the security arrangements and infringe SLA
enforcement. Fault models can disclose novel and harsh challenges, which
might empower the service providers to claim unprecedented service controls
to impact the overall fairness. A participant with dishonest intent could take
over by committing some infringement techniques affecting protocol and the
sub-protocol modules. Extended studies warrant observing what technical,
operational, regulatory, and legal requirements can be neutralized where some
of the protocol’s properties especially non-repudiation, timeliness, and fairness
can be sabotaged. SLA enforcement holds immense research opportunists
to improve and extend various use cases which can constitute cloud service
assurance level for every stakeholder at the end of the term. Architecture’s
deployment to multiple cloud environments might discover new constraints
related to the TTPs and CAs fault models such as Byzantine failures.
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Our overall concept mainly spins around two scenarios, loss-averse par-
ticipants and malicious participants who interact with each other through
outsourced entities such as TTP and the TAs using a synchronous commu-
nication model. Future work would also examine, how to attain more fair
exchange properties, by switching these service arrangements through asyn-
chronous communication model and quantifying threat modeling. This would
include help achieving SLA enforcement using cross-platform cloud service
functionalities and their QoS dependencies in a more resilient through extended
module configuration. Real-time service negotiations and dispute resolution in
a multi-tenancy cloud atmosphere can enhance the investigative avenues. There
is an honest intention to collaborate diverse service deployments using other
frameworks to intuit our architecture’s constraints. Extending our research
towards SLA enforcement would also anticipate some natural considerations
which could suggest protocol’s future optimization empowering fairness, privacy,
security, autonomy, and trustworthiness. Our protocol can also be blended
by SOA frameworks such as IT Service Management (ITSM) [148], or similar
standards empowering assurance.
It would also be extremely useful and inevitable at a later stage to redefine
our proposed architecture to comply and integrate modern security frameworks
such as COBIT [103], NIST [61, 86] Security Orchestration, Automation, and
Response (SOAR) [104], Cloud Controls Matrix [57] best practices along with
Blockchain, and AI-centric platforms, as our future extension. Such provisions
will certainly augment SME’s capabilities to have a better control attaining
and sharing reliable SLA metrics for their forensics soundness and can easily
be integrated into well-known forensics frameworks as well for investigating
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Einar Broch Johnsen, Cosimo Laneve, Ka I Pun, and Gianluigi Zavat-
taro. Analysis of sla compliance in the cloud–an automated, model-based
approach. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.10040, 2019.
[61] Frederic de Vaulx. Nist cloud service metrics model, #jun#
2014. URL https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/images/6/67/
De-Vaulx-Cloud-Service-Metrics-Model-20140806-v2.pdf. Con-
structing High-Quality Cloud Service Level Agreement (SLAs).
[62] Frederic J de Vaulx, Eric D Simmon, and Robert B Bohn. Cloud
computing service metrics description. Technical report, 2018.
121
[63] Robert H Deng, Li Gong, Aurel A Lazar, and Weiguo Wang.
Practical protocols for certified electronic mail. Journal




[64] Alex Depoutovitch, Chong Chen, J. Chen, P. Larson, Shu Lin, Jack
Ng, Wenlin Cui, Q. Liu, W. Huang, Y. Xiao, and Yongjun He. Taurus
database: How to be fast, available, and frugal in the cloud. Proceedings
of the 2020 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of
Data, 2020.
[65] Roberto Di Pietro, Flavio Lombardi, Fabio Martinelli, and Daniele Sgan-
durra. Anticheetah: Trustworthy computing in an outsourced (cheating)
environment. Future Generation Computer Systems, 48:28–38, 2015.
[66] Dimensiondata. Comparing public cloud service level agreemtns, February
2013.
[67] Yevgeniy Dodis and Leonid Reyzin. Breaking and repairing optimistic
fair exchange from podc 2003. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop
on Digital rights management, pages 47–54, 2003.
[68] Shewangu Dzomira. Electronic fraud (cyber fraud) risk in the banking
industry, zimbabwe. Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets
and Institutions, 4(2):16–26, 2014.
[69] Ahmed El-Yahyaoui and Mohamed Dafir ECH-CHERIF EL KETTANI.
A verifiable fully homomorphic encryption scheme for cloud computing
security. Technologies, 7(1):21, 2019.
[70] Vincent C. Emeakaroha, Tiago C. Ferreto, Marco Aurélio Stelmar Netto,
Ivona Brandic, and César A. F. De Rose. Casvid: Application level
monitoring for SLA violation detection in clouds. In COMPSAC, pages
499–508. IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
[71] Vincent C Emeakaroha, Ivona Brandic, Michael Maurer, and Schahram
Dustdar. Cloud resource provisioning and sla enforcement via lom2his
framework. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 25
(10):1462–1481, 2013.
[72] Clifton A Ericson and Clifton Ll. Fault tree analysis. In System Safety
Conference, Orlando, Florida, volume 1, pages 1–9, 1999.
122
[73] Thomas Erl, Anish Karmarkar, Priscilla Walmsley, Hugo Haas, L Ümit
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